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The “Publicization” of Private Space 
Sarah Schindler * 
ABSTRACT: Recently, many urban areas have moved away from the creation 
of publicly owned open spaces and toward privately owned public open spaces, 
or “POPOS.” These POPOS take many forms: concrete plazas that separate a 
building from the sidewalk; glass-windowed atriums in downtown office 
buildings; rooftop terraces and gardens; and grass-covered spaces that appear 
to be traditional parks. This Article considers the nature of POPOS and 
examines whether they live up to expectations about the role that public space 
should play and the value it should provide to communities. This analysis is 
especially important because in embracing POPOS, cities have made a 
tradeoff—they allow developers to construct larger buildings in exchange for 
the provision of this publicly accessible (yet still privately owned) space. 
Although POPOS are the primary form of new urban public space in many 
areas, legal scholars have largely ignored them, and many cities have failed 
to educate the public about their existence. This Article suggests that POPOS 
regularly fail to achieve the goals of “good” public space, in part because they 
are often exclusionary; they only feel welcoming to certain people, and they 
only permit a limited number and type of activities. Thus, this Article provides 
suggestions for improving POPOS, by changing the laws that govern their 
design and use, and importing the norms that we typically associate with 
public space into these privately owned spaces—a process that this Article 
refers to as “publicization.” In this way, this Article aspires to map a path 
forward so that POPOS will function as a form of public space worthy of the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a hidden garden on Fifth Avenue in New York that is open to 
the public. You cannot see it from the street; it is on the fourth and fifth floors 
of a tall building, and there is little signage directing you to it. The garden is 
not open to the public just because the building owner is generous; it is open 
to the public because it must be. The developer provided the garden in 
exchange for the right to make the building taller than it otherwise could 
have been.  
Although you now know about the existence of this garden, accessing it 
requires a few more steps. First, you have to enter the building and put your 
bags through an x-ray machine. Then you have to take the escalator, if it is 
open (and it is often not), or the elevator, which is sometimes manned by 
security guards, up to the garden.1 Even after all of this, the garden might be 
closed if the weather is bad. You will have to ask a security guard to be sure.  
This garden is an example of privately owned public space. The private 
owner of this particular public space? Donald Trump. The location? Trump 
Tower. 
The mention of urban public space might bring to mind a variety of 
images: a grand public park like San Francisco’s Golden Gate Park, the many 
streets and sidewalks that traverse our cities, or a plaza in front of city hall. 
Historically, state and local governments owned and managed properties such 
as these.2 However, in a number of cities, new public space of this sort is 
becoming rare; frequently, newly created public space is privately owned and 
managed.3 There are numerous examples of spaces that are open to the 
public yet owned by private entities: malls, private university campuses, and 
pools that require membership. But this Article focuses on a creature 
developed by local governments known as privately owned public open space, 
or “POPOS.”4 POPOS are typically created in one of two ways: (1) They are 
 
 1. Michelle Young, The Privately Owned Public Space Inside Trump Tower Is Already Less Accessible, 
UNTAPPED CITIES (Dec. 9, 2016), http://untappedcities.com/2016/12/09/the-privately-owned-
public-space-inside-trump-tower-is-already-less-inaccessible. 
 2. Some cities now contract out management of these spaces to private, nonprofit organizations. 
For example, Manhattan’s Central Park is managed by the Central Park Conservancy—which also 
provides approximately three quarters of the park’s operating budget—under a contract with New York 
City. About Us, CENT. PARK CONSERVANCY, http://www.centralparknyc.org/about/about-cpc (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2017). 
 3. For example, New York, San Francisco, and London have all gained new POPOS in the 
past few decades. See infra notes 132–35 and accompanying text (giving data showing the 
prevalence of POPOS).  
 4. While San Francisco refers to these spaces as POPOS, New York and much of the urban 
planning literature refers to them as POPS: privately owned public spaces. This Article will 
generally use the term POPOS, but will use POPS when quoting existing literature from New 
York. Also, though the term as defined here is singular, it will occasionally be necessary to use 
POPOS to refer to privately owned public open spaces (plural). The distinction should be clear 
from the text.  
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offered by a private developer in exchange for a density bonus, which allows 
the developer to build a taller or bulkier building than would otherwise be 
permitted under the zoning;5 or (2) they are required as a condition of 
development approval.6 The space is still privately owned, but it is legally 
required to be accessible to the public. The idea behind such a tradeoff is that 
the public space will counteract some of the negative effects of density, such 
as crowding or loss of light or air. While a small number of sociologists and 
urban theorists have studied POPOS, they have been largely ignored by legal 
scholars.7 Further, the only book on the subject was written nearly two decades 
ago.8 
There is a growing body of literature about the privatization of public 
space, which is becoming more common in urban centers.9 In many cities, the 
mall replaced the town square as the place where people gather and 
socialize.10 More recently, as malls have grown out of favor in some areas, 
developers are now building new “lifestyle centers” that often resemble 
stylized, traditional main streets, but are effectively outdoor malls on private 
property.11 Public parks are often now managed by private non-profit entities 
or Business Improvement Districts (“BIDs”).12 In some cash-strapped cities, 
officials have sold public land to private developers,13 and it is common to see 
 
 5. This was the case with Trump Tower. Aaron Elstein, Donald Trump Has a Secret Garden, CRAIN’S 
N.Y. BUS. (June 19, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20160619/REAL_ 
ESTATE/160619862/in-1979-donald-trump-made-a-deal-with-new-york-city-that-hed-provide. 
 6. For example, certain projects require a conditional use permit before they can be built. 
A requirement that the developer construct and maintain public open space on the project site 
might be one of the conditions attached to the permit. JEROLD S. KAYDEN ET AL., PRIVATELY 
OWNED PUBLIC SPACE: THE NEW YORK CITY EXPERIENCE 15 (2000). 
 7. A Westlaw search for the terms “Privately Owned Public Open Space” or “Privately 
Owned Public Space” return 42 law review articles mentioning the terms. Most of these are a 
cursory mention or a citation to Kayden’s aforementioned book. See Secondary Resources, WESTLAW, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com (in secondary resources, search “privately owned public open space” 
or “privately owned public space”) (last visited Dec. 17, 2017).  
 8. See generally KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6 (discussing POPS in New York).  
 9. See Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 20, 1991), http://www. 
nytimes.com/1991/01/20/magazine/secession-of-the-successful.html (“As public parks and 
playgrounds deteriorate, there is a proliferation of private health clubs, golf clubs, tennis clubs, skating 
clubs and every other type of recreational association in which costs are shared among members.”). See 
generally John L. Crompton, Forces Underlying the Emergence of Privatization in Parks and Recreation, 16 J. 
PARK & RECREATION ADMIN. 88 (1998) (discussing the privatization of public space).  
 10. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 257–61 (1985); JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF AMERICA’S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE 119 (1993). 
 11. Judy Keen, As Enclosed Malls Decline, ‘Lifestyle Centers’ Proliferate, MINNPOST: CITYSCAPE 
(Aug. 30, 2013), https://www.minnpost.com/cityscape/2013/08/enclosed-malls-decline-lifestyle-
centers-proliferate. 
 12. See Michael Murray, Private Management of Public Spaces: Nonprofit Organizations and Urban 
Parks, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 185–93 (2010) (describing numerous private entities that 
control urban public spaces). 
 13. See infra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.  
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restaurants taking over large portions of city sidewalks for outdoor dining.14 
Privatized public spaces are often clean and well-maintained; they feel safe 
and comfortable to many.15 Yet, a number of social scientists and geographers 
have asserted that privatized public space is problematic and a poor substitute 
for traditional public space.16 It is exclusionary. It segregates. It is sterile. It 
diminishes opportunities for free speech. It prevents people from different 
walks of life from interacting with one another. It also raises concerns from a 
local government perspective: There is a fear of loss of democratic process 
when corporations and other private entities control public spaces and the 
public realm more than citizens do.  
At first glance, POPOS appear to be examples of privatized public spaces, 
and the few commentators that have studied POPOS describe them as such.17 
POPOS are spaces that are—at least in theory—open and accessible to the 
public, but they are owned and operated by private entities. Not only are they 
descriptively similar to privatized space, but POPOS also appear to raise many 
of the same normative concerns that privatized public spaces do. For example, 
they are often exclusionary and sanitized. Further, though POPOS are 
sometimes outside along public streets, they are also often located inside 
office buildings or on rooftops, and thus are hidden from view and involve 
barriers to entry that some members of the public would not feel comfortable 
crossing. And while municipalities typically require that these spaces be open 
and accessible to the public during daylight hours, they often provide little 
additional guidance about how the spaces may or must be used.18 The result 
is that private developers and their security guards, who manage both the 
private and public space within the commercial building, generally set and 
then enforce all the rules. These private actors may not have thought seriously 
 
 14. Sarah Schindler, Café Creep, U. ME. SCH. L. FAC. RES. BLOG (Aug. 19, 2016), https:// 
mainelaw.maine.edu/faculty/cafe-creep (describing the legal regime behind and concerns associated 
with al fresco dining). 
 15. Timothy Weaver, The Privatization of Public Space: The New Enclosures, 2014 ANN. MEETING 
AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N, Aug. 28–31, 2014, at 15 (“[P]art of the appeal of privately-owned public 
spaces is that people’s quotidian interaction with them conveys the sense that they are 
indistinguishable from public spaces, except that they appear to be safer, better maintained, and 
eerily bereft of the poor.”). 
 16. See, e.g., infra notes 112–21 and accompanying text. But see JASON HACKWORTH, THE 
NEOLIBERAL CITY: GOVERNANCE, IDEOLOGY, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN URBANISM 60–76 
(2007) (discussing benefits of privatization). Arguments both for and against privatization will 
be discussed subsequently in Parts II.C.2. and III.B. 
 17. See MARGARET KOHN, BRAVE NEW NEIGHBORHOODS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC 
SPACE 4–5 (2004) (describing private ownership of public spaces as privatization); BENJAMIN 
SHEPARD & GREG SMITHSIMON, THE BEACH BENEATH THE STREETS: CONTESTING NEW YORK CITY’S 
PUBLIC SPACES 53 (2011) (describing public spaces in high rises as being privatized); Jeremy 
Németh, Defining a Public: The Management of Privately Owned Public Space, 46 URB. STUD. 2463, 
2465–66 (2009) (describing POPOS under the heading “Privatisation of Public Space”); Gregory 
Smithsimon, Dispersing the Crowd: Bonus Plazas and the Creation of Public Space, 43 URB. AFF. REV. 
325, 327 (2008) (discussing “[t]he privatization process” that created POPOS). 
 18. See infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
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about the extent of public rights in these spaces—they are (perhaps justly) 
more interested in protecting the space for use by the building’s private, 
paying tenants. Thus, POPOS owners and guards are likely to create rules and 
enforce norms associated with the primary, private building use, rather than 
rules and norms that we associate with public parks. For all of these reasons, 
scholars have lumped POPOS in with the existing privatization literature.19  
However, I assert that POPOS should be viewed differently from typical 
privatized public space. They are examples of private property that has been 
made publicly accessible by law;20 they involve private property that has been 
“publicized” rather than public property that has been privatized. Because 
there are similar benefits and concerns with privatized public space and 
publicized private space, this Article engages the privatization literature. 
However, rather than viewing POPOS solely as another example of 
privatization, this Article considers them through the lens of “publicization,” 
which should suggest the application of different laws and norms than 
privatization.21  
As I use it, the term “publicization” has both descriptive and normative 
components. Descriptively, I use it as a framework to suggest that privately 
owned property is literally being made available for use by the public. Thus, 
this property’s purely private character has diminished, and it has become 
“publicized.” Normatively, I begin with a conception of publicization as a 
 
 19. See KOHN, supra note 17, at 9–14.   
 20. When developers decide to create a mall, they are affirmatively deciding to open their 
property broadly to the public. Contrast this with a developer’s decision to build an office 
building in a municipality that requires the provision of a POPOS as a condition of development 
approval. That developer only wanted to create an office building, with the assumption that her 
right to exclude the general public would be enforced. However, she is instead required to open 
up a portion of her private property to the public. I believe that this is distinct from the mall 
creation scenario.  
 21. Others have used the word “publicization,” though not exactly as I am using it here. However, 
I draw upon those definitions in crafting my concept of the publicization of private space in Part V of 
the Article. I draw most heavily upon Professor Jody Freeman’s use of the term. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, 
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2003) (“Instead of 
seeing privatization as a means of shrinking government, I imagine it as a mechanism for expanding 
government’s reach into realms traditionally thought private. In other words, privatization can be a 
means of ‘publicization,’ through which private actors increasingly commit themselves to traditionally 
public goals as the price of access to lucrative opportunities to deliver goods and services that might 
otherwise be provided directly by the state.” (footnote omitted)); see also Gerald E. Frug, Is Secession from 
the City of Los Angeles a Good Idea?, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1783, 1784 (2002) (defining “publicazation” [sic] 
as the process of “bringing government closer to its constituents”); John Braithwaite, Strategic Socialism, 
Strategic Privatization and Crisis 4 (Austl. Nat’l Univ, RegNet Research Paper No. 2013/11, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2249544 (defining publicization as “the 
percolation of public law values into private law and into corporate self-regulation. . . . includ[ing] the 
most critical public law values such as transparency, accountability, stakeholder voice and separations 
of powers”). 
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process through which space becomes more public.22 To explain that process, 
I expand upon the concept of publicization as a scenario where “private actors 
increasingly commit themselves to traditionally public goals as the price of 
access to lucrative opportunities to deliver goods and services that might 
otherwise be provided directly by the state.”23 I extend the term to the realm 
of property law, suggesting that we might find a way not only to make these 
spaces physically accessible to members of the public, but to also import 
norms that we typically associate with idealized forms of public space into 
these hybrid, liminal POPOS.  
Describing POPOS as an example of privatization is both descriptively 
inaccurate and leads to bad results. In contrast, viewing POPOS through the 
lens of publicization allows us to envision spaces—spaces that feel more public 
and that serve public needs and desires—in a less exclusionary way than 
POPOS often currently do. The result should be spaces that provide greater 
value to the public. In order to achieve this end, cities must: (1) adopt and 
enforce more detailed regulations governing POPOS; and (2) work in 
conjunction with members of the public to enforce public-space norms in 
POPOS. Unless and until these interventions take place, POPOS will remain 
a fraught, unsuccessful means of creating new public space in our cities. 
Part II of this Article begins by considering the value and importance of 
public space and the struggle of modern cities to create more of it. It then 
surveys the privatization literature, examining reasons that many cities have 
moved toward privatized public space. In Part III, the Article provides a nuts-
and-bolts description of POPOS and the land-use process through which they 
are created. Part III also discusses the reasons that many cities allow 
developers to trade public space for bigger buildings. Part IV presents a 
critique of POPOS, considering the liminal legal space in which they exist, the 
democracy deficit that surrounds their rules of operation, their exclusionary 
nature, and their lack of authenticity. 
Part V examines POPOS through a “publicization” lens. It suggests that 
an application of this framing could be used to ensure that POPOS owners 
and managers commit themselves to public space values in order to obtain 
development permits.24 Part V considers the unexplored potential of POPOS 
to enhance conceptions of publicness and public space. Although the right to 
exclude others from one’s private property is often said to be one of the most 
important sticks in the bundle of rights associated with private-property 
ownership, POPOS present an example of cities using land-use law to force 
the right to exclude to bend a bit, which could spur the expansion of public-
space norms into these privately owned spaces. This expansion, in turn, might 
 
 22. Myriam Houssay-Holzschuch & Annika Teppo, A Mall for All? Race and Public Space in 
Post-Apartheid Cape Town, 16 CULTURAL GEOGRAPHIES 351, 352 (2009) (defining publicization as 
“the process whereby private spaces acquire a more public dimension”). 
 23. Freeman, supra note 21, at 1285. 
 24. See id. 
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foster a more progressive view of property.25 Part V concludes by discussing 
ways that laws and norms could be used to make POPOS more public, thus 
enabling them to function as a form of public space worthy of the tradeoff 
that cities are making. 
II. PUBLIC SPACE AND ITS PRIVATIZATION 
A. THE VALUE OF PUBLIC SPACE 
Public space means different things to different people. It has a number 
of different facets, each of which may yield a different definition. For 
example, if we focus on who may use public space, we may define it as space 
that is open and accessible to members of the public.26 In contrast, if we focus 
on the ownership of public space, we may define it as space that is owned by 
the government.27 Finally, if we focus on what public space is in comparison to 
what it is not, we may define it as space that is not private.28 These are all social 
dimensions of public space, but public space also has a physical dimension.29 
Public space can be designed and constructed in ways that either increase its 
likelihood of use or that repel people from it. And of course, there is a 
difference between what people imagine public space ought to be and what it 
actually is. As I use the term here—especially because I will be focusing on 
privately owned public space—public space means space that is “open and 
accessible to all members of the public in a society, in principle though not 
necessarily in practice.”30 
 
 25. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009) (focusing on situations where the right to exclude should be diluted 
in order to enhance human flourishing).  
 26. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 17, at 10–11 (“Intuitively we take public to mean open or 
accessible, yet many public buildings are not open to all. Bureaucratic headquarters and military 
installations, for example, are owned by the government but inaccessible to most citizens.”); cf. 
Cédric Terzi & Stéphane Tonnelat, The Publicization of Public Space, 49 ENV’T & PLAN. A 519, 520 
(2016) (“[D]iscrimination against categories of the population usually considered as minorities, 
women, people of color, homeless people, etc. is often taken as a reliable measure of the publicity 
of urban space.” (citations omitted)). 
 27. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 17, at 11 (“In everyday speech a public space usually refers to 
a place that is owned by the government, accessible to everyone without restriction, and/or 
fosters communication and interaction.”). 
 28. Id. at 21 n.34 (“A private space . . . is characterized by the way individuals or groups can 
exclude outsiders. Thus private space is not only a matter of ownership but also of regulation and 
control of access.”). 
 29. Id. at 11; see also Sara K. Rankin, The Influence of Exile, 76 MD. L. REV. 4, 24 (2016) (“In 
a purely physical sense, public space refers to any combination of a built and natural environment 
that is accessible to the public as a whole for collective or personal activities.”). 
 30. Zachary P. Neal, Locating Public Space, in COMMON GROUND? READINGS AND REFLECTIONS 
ON PUBLIC SPACE 1, 1 (Anthony M. Orum & Zachary P. Neal eds., 2010) (emphasis omitted). 
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Places that are open and usable by all carry with them a number of 
benefits and are a valuable feature of urban life.31 Specifically, well-
functioning public space: (1) fosters interaction between people with diverse 
viewpoints and from different socio-economic backgrounds;32 (2) helps 
nurture democratic values by providing a site for democratic process and free 
assembly;33 (3) serves as a “third place” and thus can build social capital and 
decrease atomization;34 (4) is functional, allowing people to get from place to 
place;35 and (5) provides space for those with nowhere else to go.36 
Public space is often said to be the lifeblood of cities.37 This 
characterization is in part because public space is where many of our 
interactions occur—especially those that are unplanned or accidental.38 
Further, public space provides the situs, and thus the opportunity, to interact 
 
 31. For a discussion of similar concepts in the context of private space and neighborhoods, 
see Robin Paul Malloy, Inclusion by Design: Accessible Housing and Mobility Impairment, 60 HASTINGS 
L.J. 699, 710 (2009). 
 32. See Rankin, supra note 29, at 25 (“[S]haring public space actually challenges our 
instincts to create social segregation by physically integrating us with diverse strangers.”). 
 33. See, e.g., JOHN R. PARKINSON, DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC SPACE: THE PHYSICAL SITES OF 
DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE 4 (2012) (noting that academics have argued “democracy requires 
physical space for its performance”). 
 34. Sarah Schindler, The Future of Abandoned Big Box Stores: Legal Solutions to the Legacies of 
Poor Planning Decisions, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 471, 479 (2012) (“The third place provides a sense 
of community engagement and involvement, which is separate from those found at the first place 
(home) and the second place (work).”); see also generally RAY OLDENBURG, THE GREAT GOOD 
PLACE: CAFÉS, COFFEE SHOPS, BOOKSTORES, BARS, HAIR SALONS, AND OTHER HANGOUTS AT THE 
HEART OF A COMMUNITY (1999) (explaining a number of gathering places which form important 
aspects of their respective communities). 
 35. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 25–35. 
 36. See Terzi & Tonnelat, supra note 26, at 521 (suggesting that public space “must be 
maintained as a place of last resort for the part of the population that has nowhere else to go in 
a city increasingly devoted to leisure and consumption”). 
 37. See, e.g., KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at vii (“Physical public spaces are important 
contributors to the life of cities.”); Jeremy Németh & Justin Hollander, Security Zones and New York 
City’s Shrinking Public Space, 34 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 20, 21 (2010) (“Public spaces are 
the lifeblood of cities.”); see also JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 
chs. 2–6 (1992) (discussing the value of public space). 
 38. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at vii. Some have argued that this may no longer be true, 
and there is less need for physical public space due to the existence and prevalence of cyberspace 
and the internet. See Ash Amin, Collective Culture and Urban Public Space, 12 CITY 5, 5 (2008) (“In 
an age of urban sprawl, multiple usage of public space and proliferation of the sites of political 
and cultural expression, it seems odd to expect public spaces to fulfil their traditional role as 
spaces of civic inculcation and political participation.”). See generally Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as 
Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2003) (discussing cyberspace 
as public space); Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1115, 1116 (2005) (“Other Internet law scholars have claimed that the Internet should be 
conceptualized as one grand ‘public forum’ . . . .”); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Property Rights and 
Competition on the Internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561 (2001) 
(discussing cyberspace as public space).  
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with people who are outside our typical social circles39—people who Gerald 
Frug refers to as “unfamiliar kinds of strangers.”40 By encountering and 
engaging with these strangers in public space, people open themselves up to 
“unprogrammed” discussions and “diverse viewpoints.”41  
Public space also provides citizens with a space for the performance of 
democracy.42 Indeed, according to one commentator, democracy is dependent 
upon the existence of public space.43 The Supreme Court seems to have 
recognized this important role that public space plays in the lives of its 
citizens. In 1939, it said:  
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time 
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient 
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties 
of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the 
streets and parks for communication of views on national questions 
may be regulated in the interest of all . . . but it must not, in the guise 
of regulation, be abridged or denied.44 
Here, the Court expressly values the importance of public space as a site for 
free assembly. It also values the role that this space plays in fostering 
communications and discussions about important public issues. As 
commentators have pointed out, freedom of expression and assembly are 
“essential elements of citizenship.”45 Thus, public space provides a site for the 
performance and expression of these democratic values.46 
 
 39. See, e.g., Németh & Hollander, supra note 37, at 21 (“More than simple physical entities, 
truly public spaces are sites of interaction in which individuals are sometimes forced to interact 
with those whom they usually criticize or dislike.”). 
 40. Gerald E. Frug, Public Space / Private Space, in THE PRAGMATIST IMAGINATION: THINKING 
ABOUT “THINGS IN THE MAKING” 82, 85 (Joan Ockman ed., 2000). 
 41. Németh, supra note 17, at 2463; see also Nicholas Blomley, Introduction: Public Space to 
THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE 3, 3–5 (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 
2001) (discussing public space and interaction). 
 42. PARKINSON, supra note 33, at 48 (“Democratic performance involves four primary roles: 
narrating interests, opinion, and experience; making public claims; deciding about those claims; 
and scrutinizing and accounting for decisions and actions.”). 
 43. Id.; see also Neil Smith & Setha Low, Introduction: The Imperative of Public Space to THE 
POLITICS OF PUBLIC SPACE 1, 1–2 (Setha Low & Neil Smith eds., 2006) (discussing public spaces 
as one of the last independent forums for public opposition in a civil society). 
 44. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939). 
 45. Weaver, supra note 15, at 14. 
 46. Setha M. Low, The Erosion of Public Space and the Public Realm: Paranoia, Surveillance and 
Privatization in New York City, 18 CITY & SOC’Y 43, 43 (2006) (describing “public space and the 
democratic values it represents”). 
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These features of public space—that it serves as a site for the assembly of 
diverse people and an exchange of diverse ideas—suggest that public space 
also often serves as an important “third place.”47 Urban theorists distinguish 
the third place from the “first place,” which is the home, and the “second 
place,” which is the workplace.48 The third place provides a location for 
people within a community to gather and exchange ideas. This interaction 
can lead to an increase in social capital and a reduction in feelings of 
isolation.49 In many communities, the most common third place is the street 
or sidewalk. This fact suggests another, although admittedly less romantic, 
benefit of public space: It is functional. It allows people to get from place to 
place. Streets and sidewalks provide routes of connection between and 
through localities and are mostly used for transportation. 
Finally, public space provides a location for people who lack access to a 
first or second place to exist. People who are homeless comprise the most 
obvious segment of society that needs and depends on public space in this 
way. Those who are homeless rely on public space “as a refuge, as a place to 
sleep, as a stopping point, as a place of community and conviviality.”50 These 
benefits also accrue to those who are not homeless, but perhaps have small 
houses or apartments and thus can benefit from extra space in which to exist. 
The best public spaces would provide all of these diverse individuals with all 
 
 47. See generally Schindler, supra note 34. 
 48. OLDENBURG, supra note 34, at 16. 
 49. See, e.g., Thomas G. Poder, What Is Really Social Capital? A Critical Review, 42 AM. 
SOCIOLOGIST 341, 342 (2011) (describing social capital as the sum of “social interactions [that] 
create social networks, foster confidence, influence the formation of values, support the norms 
and culture, and generate the community”); see also Stephanie M. Stern, The Dark Side of Town: 
The Social Capital Revolution in Residential Property Law, 99 VA. L. REV. 811, 812 (2013) (defining 
Putnam’s social capital as “the aggregate value of citizen participation in associations and 
organizations, social ties and networks, civic engagement, trust, and norms of reciprocity”). See 
generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY (2000) (discussing increasing isolation and fragmentation of society). 
 50. DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC SPACE 
15, 28 (2003) (noting that “[b]y denying the right to sleep, defecate, eat or relax somewhere . . . 
contemporary anti-homeless laws . . . simply deny homeless people the right to be at all”); see also Jeremy 
Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295, 300 (1991) (“The homeless are 
allowed to be—provided they are on the streets, in the parks, or under the bridges.”); cf. MITCHELL, 
supra, at 36 n.3 (New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani said: “Streets do not exist in civilized societies 
for the purpose of sleeping there. Bedrooms are for sleeping in . . . .” (citing Elisabeth Bumiller, In 
Wake of Attack, Giuliani Cracks Down on Homeless, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 1999), http://www.nytimes. 
com/1999/11/20/nyregion/in-wake-of-attack-giuliani-cracks-down-on-homeless.html)).  
SCHINDLER_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2018  1:12 PM 
1104 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1093 
of these diverse benefits.51 While good public space ought to serve all of these 
functions,52 not all public space does so in fact. 
B. AN ASIDE: PUBLIC SPACE AS ROMANTIC IDEAL OR EXCLUSIONARY REALITY? 
It is important to pause here and acknowledge that many people have an 
idealized vision of public space: what it ought to be, who it ought to be for, 
and what values it should serve. The reality is that public space does not always 
build community and foster discourse among diverse segments of the 
population. Public space—even when it is publicly owned and managed—is 
often exclusionary.53 
There are a number of reasons for the exclusionary nature of public 
space that will be addressed in more detail below, but generally, these reasons 
involve the design, operation, and ownership structures of these spaces.54 
Even public parks often restrict activities that might seem to be acceptable 
and proper uses of public space.55 For example, in Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non-Violence, the Supreme Court upheld a rule, put in place by the 
National Park Service, which prohibited people from sleeping in parks in 
Washington, D.C.56 The Court found that rule to be an acceptable time, place, 
and manner restriction.57 While this rule ostensibly applies to everyone, 
homeless people and those who are visibly poor have long been excluded 
 
 51. See Németh, supra note 17, at 2463; see also Joseph B. Rose, Preface to KAYDEN ET AL., 
supra note 6, at viii (describing successful public spaces as those “that contribute positively to city 
life incorporat[ing] values of good site planning, urban context, and public accessibility and use 
into their design and operation”). 
 52. It is perhaps intuitive that some of the elements discussed here contribute to “good 
public space.” However, it is harder to decide whether other features of a space are normatively 
good. The next Subpart, II.B., will address those issues. 
 53. This is not a new phenomenon. As Don Mitchell pointed out, “the streets and parks of 
the city, like the Greek agora, Roman forums, or 18th-century German coffeehouses before them, 
have never simply been places of free, unmediated interaction. Rather, they have always also been 
spaces of exclusion.” MITCHELL, supra note 50, at 131–32 (citation omitted); see also Margaret 
Crawford, Contesting the Public Realm: Struggles over Public Space in Los Angeles, 49 J. ARCHITECTURAL 
EDUC. 4, 4 (1995) (noting that the agora was closed to women and slaves, and that current public 
space privileges “middle–class and masculine modes of public speech”); Sarah Schindler, 
Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through Physical Design of the Built Environment, 
124 YALE L.J. 1934, 1989 (2015) (discussing the way that cities use infrastructure to divide and 
segregate populations). 
 54. Low, supra note 46, at 44 (discussing threats to public space in the form of “design, 
management, and systems of ownership that reduce diversity”). 
 55. “Public parks are certainly quintessential public forums where free speech is protected, 
but the Constitution neither provides, nor has it ever been construed to mandate, that any person 
or group be allowed to erect structures at will.” Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 
917 F.2d 341, 347 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 56. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298–99 (1984).  
 57. Id. 
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from public space, and laws criminalizing their behavior in public are 
becoming more common.58 
That said, there remains a question: Can public space still have some value 
even if it is exclusionary and only caters to a particular segment of the 
population? If public space fails to foster the mixing of socio-economic groups 
and the mixing of ideas, is there still value in the existence of the space itself? 
The question of value is loaded and subjective, but it is certainly true that 
these spaces might still have some practical benefits. For example, these 
spaces can still provide for light and air. They may also provide a place of 
respite for some (even if not for all). Considering this evidence, some might 
believe that the existence of an exclusionary space is better than having no 
space at all.59  
Another side of this discussion, which is relevant to an examination of 
inclusion and exclusion in public space, concerns “failed” or “unsuccessful” 
public spaces. It is possible that failed public spaces—those that are not well-
designed, that make some people feel uneasy, and that are scary, dirty, and 
underused—could be inclusionary in some sense. For example, New York’s 
Bryant Park was “a crime-ridden haven for junkies” that was transformed into 
“a six-acre jewel.”60 It is currently very popular with well-dressed workers and 
visitors. However, one could argue that, before it was “cleaned up,” Bryant 
Park was inclusive with respect to the very people who are generally excluded 
from public and private spaces: the homeless and visibly poor.61 It is hard to 
know how to measure inclusivity and exclusivity, and how they relate to the 
 
 58. See Jack Healy, Rights Battles Emerge in Cities Where Homelessness Can Be a Crime, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/us/rights-battles-emerge-in-cities-where-
homelessness-can-be-a-crime.html (recognizing that cities are grappling with this problem, trying 
to decide whether to “open up public spaces to their poorest residents, or sweep away camps that 
city leaders, neighbors and business groups see as islands of drugs and crime”). See generally 
Rankin, supra note 29 (discussing criminalization of homelessness). 
 59. Of course, these are not necessarily the only two options: either exclusionary space or 
none at all. And others have grappled with this question. For example, Murray noted that a 
private park manager might decide to close a poorly maintained park because  
this closure would actually advance the public good in the neighborhood, including 
the public good from the park, because of the negative externalities associated with 
an open but ill-maintained park. Closing the park entirely or for most of the time 
reduces the problems of drugs, crime, and loitering in the neighborhood and in the 
park itself, assuming spillover. Yet the public trust doctrine has no way to account 
for an increase in the public good associated with the park despite a non-park use—
here closure—of the park.  
Murray, supra note 12, at 245. 
 60. E.S. Savas, Privatization and the New Public Management, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1731, 1732 
(2001). 
 61. “[T]he increased use of public spaces by homeless persons led owners to seek, and the City 
[of New York] to adopt in 1979, a zoning amendment allowing the City Planning Commission to 
authorize owners to close certain through block plazas and contiguous arcades at night if, among 
other things, they agreed to upgrade the space to urban plaza standards.” KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 
6, at 19 (citing N.Y.C., City Planning Commission, N 780630 ZRM (Jan. 22, 1979)). 
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value of a space. Certainly, in sheer numbers, Bryant Park is used by more 
people now than it was before its clean up. But does that necessarily make it 
more inclusionary? Failed public spaces have the potential to feel more 
inclusionary and less exclusionary when considered from the perspective of 
some segments of the urban population. The remainder of this Article will 
further develop these ideas surrounding the value of public space. 
C. THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SPACE 
1. How Is Public Space Privatized? 
In recent years, we have seen a rise in the privatization of the formerly 
public provision of goods.62 One commentator describes this phenomenon as 
“the encroachment of corporate interests into civic life.”63 Public space, a 
quintessential element of civic life, has not been exempt from this trend: 
Fewer cities are investing in the direct creation of new publicly owned public 
space, and there has been an increase in privatized public space.64  
Just as public space has many meanings, so too does privatization. The 
privatization of public space can occur in many forms. At its most specific 
level, one could envision the sale of publicly owned land to a private entity.65 
For example, the Atlanta City Council recently agreed to transfer use and 
control of portions of three downtown streets to a private developer as part of 
a larger development deal.66 Similarly, Salt Lake City sold a block of land in 
 
 62. Freeman, supra note 21, at 1287 n.7 (“In the United States, privatization encompasses 
a variety of arrangements through which private actors increasingly perform functions or provide 
services traditionally thought to be within the purview of government, usually with government 
financing or pursuant to government contracts, and with varying degrees of government 
involvement.”); see Jane K. Winn, The Secession of the Successful: The Rise of Amazon as Private Global 
Consumer Protection Regulator, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 196–97 (2016) (discussing the privatization of 
public law). 
 63. Cassim Shepard, Introduction to Douglas Woodward, Rules of Conduct, URB. OMNIBUS 
(May 9, 2012), http://urbanomnibus.net/2012/05/rules-of-conduct. 
 64. See, e.g., SETHA LOW ET AL., RETHINKING URBAN PARKS: PUBLIC SPACE AND CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY 1 (2005) (noting the increase in privatization of urban public spaces); Murray, supra 
note 12, at 180 (“Private organizations control an increasing number of urban public spaces.”). 
Some commentators have suggested that the reason for this is because “alternative methods for 
securing small public spaces, such as buying them with money from the City’s capital budget, 
would be less worthwhile or simply unrealistic.” KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 307 n.6. 
 65. See Weaver, supra note 15, at 2 (stating that “the transfer of publically-owned [sic] land 
or resources to private entities seeking to enhance the ‘exchange value’ of the space or of the 
resources associated with it . . . is what most people mean by the term ‘privatization’”). 
 66. Scott Trubey & Leon Stafford, UPDATE: Council OKs Plan to Abandon Streets to Finish 
Underground Sale, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 5, 2016, 3:02 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt—
politics/update-council-oks-plan-abandon-streets-finish-underground-sale/MU7TBFvXr7ZPRUGdDB 
xAqO (Portions of the streets “would be ‘abandoned’ by the city and become the property of WRS 
after a consummation of the Underground sale. That would give control of the streets to the 
developer . . . . WRS would have the power to shut off vehicular traffic, or potentially to keep 
pedestrians or bicyclists from using the roads . . . .”). 
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their downtown area to the Mormon Church.67 However, privatization 
encompasses much more than just straightforward conveyances. More 
generally, any sort of public space that has some type of private ownership, 
management, or control could be viewed as privatized public space.  
For example, in many cities, a number of publicly owned parks are 
managed and operated by private entities.68 New York’s Bryant Park, 
mentioned earlier,69 is still owned by the city.70 However, it is run by a private 
non-profit, the Bryant Park Corporation, in conjunction with a local Business 
Improvement District.71 These entities were also instrumental in the park’s 
transformation. Another example is Manhattan’s Madison Square Park, which 
was officially opened as a public park in 1847 and is now overseen by the 
nonprofit Madison Square Park Conservancy.72 Its operations are financed in 
part through a food concession located within the park.73 Even New York’s 
famous Central Park is privately managed by the Central Park Conservancy, a 
“friends of the park,” private, nonprofit group.74 
Another example of this type of privatization involves suburban 
neighborhoods that are governed and managed by Home Owners 
 
 67. KOHN, supra note 17, at 3 (describing “the narrow sense” of privatization as “the sale of 
state-owned assets to individuals or corporations”). 
 68. See, e.g., Patrick Arden, The High Cost of Free Parks: Do Public-Private Partnerships Save Parks 
or Exploit Them?, 27 NEXT AM. CITY 42, 43 (2010) (“Public-private partnerships are widely touted 
as the new model for cities to build and maintain parkland . . . .”). 
 69. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 70. Savas, supra note 60, at 1732. 
 71. The Bryant Management Corporation. See E-mail from Joe Carella, Joseph J. Carella Assocs., 
Inc. Pub. Relations, to Sarah Schindler (Dec. 9, 2016) (on file with author); see also Cathryn Swan, 
Privatization of the Commons in Mayor Bloomberg’s New York — Part II: Who Has Control?, HUFFINGTON POST 
(June 26, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cathryn-swan/new-york-parks-privatization_b_31 
12139.html.  
In a BID, owners of nonexempt real property pay a periodic assessment to the 
municipality, over and above their ordinary municipal taxes. That assessment money 
is used to fund the construction of capital improvements to land in the district and 
the provision of certain services intended to promote business activity in the district.  
Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, Inc., 158 F.3d 92, 94 (2d. Cir. 1998). For a definition 
of a Business Improvement District, see infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
 72. Park History, MADISON SQUARE PARK, https://www.madisonsquarepark.org/about-the-
park/park-history (last visited Dec. 18, 2017). According to the park’s website, the park 
experienced “several decades of unfortunate neglect,” which led to the City Parks Foundation—
a nonprofit focused on bringing programming to parks—starting “the Campaign for the New 
Madison Square Park.” Id. 
 73. Arden, supra note 68, at 43. That concession, Shake Shack, collected $4.9 million in revenues 
in 2009, of which a little under $350,000 went to the park (and less than that, about $220,000, went 
to the City). Id. Of note, the Conservancy paid $750,000 for the construction of the Shake Shack. See 
Shake Shack, MADISON SQUARE PARK, https://www.madisonsquarepark.org/mad-sq-food/shake-shack 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2017). 
 74. See Murray, supra note 12, at 203–29. 
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Associations (“HOAs”).75 HOAs generally comprise groups of private 
individuals who live in a given neighborhood.76 While the streets that run 
through those neighborhoods might technically be public streets, there is 
often a feeling of exclusivity, especially if one has to pass through a gate or 
entryway to access the neighborhood. 
Scholars have also defined privatization to include spaces that appear to 
be public, but that are actually owned by private entities.77 For example, the 
privatization literature discusses shopping malls, which are owned by private 
entities but used by members of the public.78 Indeed, in many communities, 
the mall has supplanted a traditional town square and thus functions as 
traditional public space, despite being privately owned and managed.79 
Similarly, certain private plazas and atriums are required by law to be open to 
the public. These Privately Owned Public Open Spaces will be the focus of the 
remainder of this Article. Finally, the way that a space is used influences 
whether one views it as privatized or not. To the extent that access is very 
restrictive, the space might be viewed as private regardless of who owns or 
manages it.80 
Just as there are many types of privatized public space, there are also 
many methods of establishing this type of space. Gerald Frug has pointed out 
ways that the law has been used to aid in the privatization of public space.81 
These methods include: funding for highways, where people ride in isolation 
in their cars, instead of funding for mass transit, which brings people into 
contact with one another;82 gated communities, which often segregate by race 
and class;83 and BIDs, where businesses tax themselves in order to fund 
 
 75. See CMTY. ASS’N INST., NATIONAL AND STATE STATISTICAL REVIEW FOR 2015 COMMUNITY 
ASSOCIATION DATA 3 (2015), https://www.caionline.org/PressReleases/Documents/2015_ 
StatsReview.pdf (estimating that over 20% of the U.S. population resides in neighborhoods with 
community associations). 
 76. See, e.g., David L. Callies et. al., Ramapo Looking Forward: Gated Communities, Covenants, 
and Concerns, 35 URB. LAW. 177, 199 (2003) (describing HOAs generally and noting that their 
“board of directors, which can only be made up of homeowners, must enforce the [neighborhood 
covenants, conditions and restrictions], manage the association’s assets, and provide upkeep for 
the common areas” (footnote omitted)). 
 77. See Weaver, supra note 15, at 1 (describing “the increasing prevalence of spaces that 
appear to be public but are in fact privately owned”). 
 78. See generally Anne Bottomley, A Trip to the Mall: Revisiting the Public/Private Divide, in 
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON LAND LAW 65 (Hilary Lim & Anne Bottomley eds., 2007) (discussing 
shopping malls). 
 79. See KOHN, supra note 17, at 4. 
 80. See Low, supra note 46, at 45 (“Restricting access and posting extensive restrictions 
further privatizes” the use of public space.). 
 81. Frug, supra note 40, at 84–87. 
 82. Id. at 86 (“Mass transit and walkable streets are two of the major sources of public space 
in America: they enable the daily experience of crossing paths with different kinds of people.”). 
 83. Id. at 84–85. 
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specific projects within their boundaries.84 In each of these instances, public 
spaces that were historically open to broad swaths of the community are being 
partially closed off and made unavailable to some.85 
Privatization is a subject that evokes passionate feelings. Because the 
academic literature on the topic is so vast,86 a thorough analysis is beyond the 
scope of this Article. However, at the most basic level, there are common 
arguments both for and against the privatization of public goods. These 
arguments apply in the context of public space, as the next Subpart will 
discuss.  
2. Reasons for the Privatization of Public Space 
There are a number of reasons that the privatization of public space has 
become popular. Perhaps the most commonly asserted benefit of the private 
provision of goods is that it is more efficient, allowing governments to obtain 
“high-quality services at the lowest possible cost.”87 This rationale is appealing 
to local governments, many of whom lack sufficient resources to provide all 
of the services that their constituents demand, and thus are looking for ways 
to lower costs.  
A good example of the efficient private provision of high quality public 
space is the aforementioned Bryant Park, the transformation of which has 
been hailed by many as a success.88 By all accounts, the park now has more 
 
 84. Id. at 86–87. 
 85. See id. at 84. 
 86. While scholars have long been writing about privatization, a new vein of related work 
emerged over the past decade: New Governance scholarship. This literature is also vast and has 
encountered its share of critics, primarily because it tries to encompass so much that it seems to 
lack any precise meaning. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and 
in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 496 (2004) 
(noting that “New Governance is not a single model, but a loosely related family of alternative 
approaches to governance”). That said, many scholars have tried to cabin it. Karen Bradshaw 
notes that “[a] central feature of new governance is extralegal regulation that privileges private 
actors in rule setting and rule enforcement.” Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and Industry 
Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2515, 2516 (2013). Douglas NeJaime pointed out that “New 
Governance scholars recognize recent trends of privatization and decentralization and seek to 
reconfigure them as locations for innovation in law and policy.” Douglas NeJaime, When New 
Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 325 (2009). And Lisa Alexander recognized that “[n]ew 
governance clearly encompasses familiar recent governance innovations such as privatization, 
devolution, decentralization [and] public-private partnerships.” Lisa T. Alexander, Reflections on 
Success and Failure in New Governance and the Role of the Lawyer, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 737, 739. 
 87. Freeman, supra note 21, at 1296. 
 88. See, e.g., Julia Vitullo-Martin, The Private Sector Shows How to Run a City, WALL ST. J., May 
20, 1998, at A14 (praising the transformation). But see Ethan Kent, When Bad Things Happen to 
Good Parks, PROJECT FOR PUB. SPACES (Sept. 1, 2004), https://www.pps.org/reference/ 
september2004bryant (suggesting that the park feels “increasingly off-limits to the citizens of the 
city”); Murray, supra note 12, at 233 (the Bryant Park Corporation “discouraged visits by those 
individuals . . . view[ed] as ‘unsavory’ by preventing washing in the restrooms and sleeping on 
mats in the park”). Notably, the City of New York contributed about half of the necessary funds 
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users and is cleaner and safer.89 Further, the City of New York contributes 
virtually nothing to its operational budget today.90 When the Bryant Park 
Corporation’s predecessor began its management of the park, it relied largely 
on donations and assessments from the BID to fund its operations.91 Now, 
however, it is primarily dependent on market-based sources of revenue, 
including income from rents, concessions, events, and user fees.92 The 
nonprofit corporation is also tasked with physical management of the space; 
this allocation results in lower monitoring costs than would be required if the 
public Parks Department were tasked with physical management, as that 
department has a number of other parks and tasks to oversee.93 All of this 
frees up money so that the city can target tax dollars to parks that are in 
greater need of funding and oversight.94 Success stories such as this one have 
led some scholars to suggest that the private sector can be used broadly and 
effectively to aid failing downtowns.95 
Privatized public space can also be viewed as a response to “the tragedy 
of the commons.”96 Members of the public have economic incentives to 
exploit common property, but not to maintain or conserve it.97 The problems 
of overuse and exploitation can be solved, in part, by privatizing the 
ownership and management of public space because private owners have 
economic incentives to keep the space well-maintained, and they do so at their 
own cost (not at the cost of the government).98  
While many cities look to privatization as a way to save money, other cities 
use it to help them raise money. Privatized public space allows a city to raise 
money by, for example, charging groups for use of the space. Many parks rent 
 
for the restoration of the park in the early 1980s. ALEXANDER GARVIN & GAYLE BERENS, URBAN 
PARKS AND OPEN SPACE 56 (1997); Murray, supra note 12, at 231. 
 89. Murray, supra note 12, at 238 (“Usership has increased. . . . Users also have conveyed 
feelings of safety in user surveys. . . . Eighty-eight percent of the businesses and residents surveyed 
in 2001 believed that ‘conditions in the Park had greatly improved over the past ten years’ . . . .”). 
 90. According to the Park’s public relations firm, “no public funding” other than BID 
assessments are used to maintain or operate Bryant Park at this time. E-mail from Joe Carella, 
supra note 71. The P.R. representative stated, “Bryant Park is completely self-sustaining even 
though it’s a city-owned park under the auspices of the Department of Parks & Recreation.” Id. 
 91. Murray, supra note 12, at 229. 
 92. Id. at 229, 236 (showing that by 2007, only 10% of the park’s revenue came from 
government, down from 40% in 1992, when the park reopened after renovations). Of note, the 
City is still responsible for the provision of fire and police service. Id. at 233. 
 93. Id. at 229. 
 94. Arden, supra note 68, at 43. 
 95. Németh, supra note 17, at 2465. 
 96. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) 
(discussing the perils of common property ownership). 
 97. Id. at 1244.  
 98. This can result in a conflict of interest, because the private manager of the space has 
her own goals and may seek to manage the property so as to maximize her own utility rather than 
the utility of the public. Further, since the manager is not elected, she lacks accountability. See 
supra Part II.C.2. 
SCHINDLER_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2018  1:12 PM 
2018] THE “PUBLICIZATION” OF PRIVATE SPACE 1111 
out picnic tables, but the San Francisco Recreation and Park Department 
recently proposed a pilot program to rent portions of the grass in popular 
Dolores Park.99 The fee for such rentals would have been between $33 and 
$260, depending on the size of the requesting group, plus a $200 security 
deposit.100 However, community uproar in response to this program led the 
city to repeal it.101 The city continues to rent picnic tables,102 and the fees are 
higher for corporations and businesses than they are for families, schools, and 
non-profits.103 
Privatizing public space can also result in space that is cleaner and more 
secure. For example, some areas have set up BIDs.104 The businesses within 
the boundaries of the district tax themselves in order to raise money for things 
like private security guards or private cleaning services.105 These services can 
result in public spaces—including streets, sidewalks, and parks—that have less 
trash and feel safer than those without the additional services purchased 
through private funds.106 
Finally, for many, privatization is a way to shrink government, which is 
viewed not only as less efficient than the private sector, but as intruding into 
spaces that the market should control.107 Indeed, some view a reduction in 
the size of government as “an important goal in itself”108 and a way to move 
 
 99. Brock Keeling, UPDATE: City Suspends Dolores Park Reservations, CURBED S.F. (May 24, 
2016, 8:34 AM), https://sf.curbed.com/2016/5/24/11760328/dolores-park-reservations. 
 100. According to the city, the fees generated would be used, at least in part, to pay for trash 
pick-up at the park, which currently costs the city around $750,000 per year. See id.  
 101. See, e.g., Jane Kim (@JaneKim), TWITTER (May 23, 2016, 6:16 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
janekim/status/734915947778052098 (“I’m opposed to the plan to rent space at Dolores Park. Our 
city’s not for sale and it shouldn’t be for rent either.”); Jack Morse, Rec and Parks to Kill Dolores Park Rental 
Program Following Backlash, SFIST (May 24, 2016, 11:05 AM), http://sfist.com/2016/05/24/supervisor 
_jane_kim_announces_resol.php. 
 102. See Dolores Park Children’s Picnic Areas, S.F. RECREATION & PARKS, http://sfrecpark.org/ 
destination/mission-dolores-park/dolores-park-childrens-picnic-areas (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).  
 103. Picnic & Impact Fees 2017, S.F. RECREATION & PARKS, http://sfrecpark.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/Picnic-Impact-Fees-2017.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).  
 104. See Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban 
Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 368–69 (1999) (describing BIDs); see also GEORGE L. KELLING 
& CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN 
OUR COMMUNITIES 113–14 (1996) (describing the functions of BIDs). 
 105. See generally KELLING & COLES, supra note 104. 
 106. See, e.g., William J. Bratton, New Strategies for Combating Crime in New York City, 23 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 781, 789 (1996) (giving BIDs credit for improving safety and cleanliness); 
Daniel R. Garodnick, What’s the BID Deal? Can the Grand Central Business Improvement District Serve 
A Special Limited Purpose?, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1740 (2000) (“The BID’s security patrol has 
produced a sixty percent drop in crime . . . .”). 
 107. See generally Janet Rothenberg Pack, The Opportunities and Constraints of Privatization, in 
PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 281 (William T. Gormley, Jr. ed., 1991) (describing 
privatization and governance); Savas, supra note 60 (same). 
 108. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE 
GOVERNMENT 244 (1988). 
SCHINDLER_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2018  1:12 PM 
1112 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1093 
away from a monopolistic system of service-provision.109 Thus, if there are 
fewer publicly owned parks to manage, local parks departments would need 
to hire fewer employees. This reduction in staffing might, in turn, lead to a 
reduction in taxes.110 
Despite these justifications, many commentators share concerns about 
the privatization of public space. Generally, these concerns include that 
public space is often exclusionary,111 sanitized, and unlikely to result in 
discourse between different segments of the population.112 These concerns 
are exacerbated by the fact that privatization regimes tend to focus resources 
on public space in wealthy areas, while ignoring those in poorer 
neighborhoods.113 This disparity results in “two-tier” park systems, where 
wealthy communities have “showplace parks” that are often managed and 
supported by private groups, like friends-of-the-park organizations.114 In 
contrast, existing parks in poorer neighborhoods are often neglected, and 
new public space—privatized or otherwise—is rare.115 Because these concerns 
with privatized public space also apply to POPOS—the focus of this Article—
they will be discussed in more detail below.116 
That said, a more general concern with privatization bears introduction 
now, as it is also central to the concerns of this Article: Some argue that 
privatization “erodes the public law norms” such as “accountability, due 
 
 109. See generally John L. Crompton, Forces Underlying the Emergence of Privatization in Parks and 
Recreation, 16 J. PARK & RECREATION ADMIN. 88 (1998) (discussing privatization and reducing the 
size of government). 
 110. John B. Goodman & Gary W. Loveman, Does Privatization Serve the Public Interest?, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1991, at 26. 
 111. For example, while Bryant Park is now supported primarily by market-based revenues, which 
is a financial benefit to the City, some critics have argued that it is too exclusionary; the park is 
sometimes closed to the public and rented out for private events. See Harris Kenny, Stossel Gets It Right 
on Parks Privatization, REASON FOUND. (Dec. 2, 2010, 12:08 PM), http://reason.org/blog/show/ 
stossel-gets-it-right-on-parks-priv (“[S]ince 1996 it has not required a single dollar from New York City 
taxpayers.”); Swan, supra note 71. 
 112. For example, one commentator has stated that “[t]he privatization of public space 
gradually undermines the feeling that people of different classes and cultures live in the same 
world” and “exacerbates the effects of racial and class segregation that already exist[] in housing 
patterns.” KOHN, supra note 17, at 8. 
 113. See Arden, supra note 68, at 43 (noting the “wide—and growing—disparities between 
lavish, showplace parks for the haves and cast-off parcels for the have-nots”); Timothy Williams, 
Report Assails Poor Upkeep in City Parks, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2006/06/16/nyregion/16parks.html (noting that “parks in poor and minority neighborhoods 
are so poorly maintained that the neglect is tantamount to a civil rights issue” while “parks in 
wealthier areas have increasingly become pristine” due in part to “private organizations like the 
Central Park Conservancy and the Bryant Park Restoration Corporation”). 
 114. Arden, supra note 68, at 43; Douglas Martin, Trying New Ways To Save Decaying Parks, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 15, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/15/nyregion/trying-new-ways-to-save-
decaying-parks.html (describing the fear of “a two-tier system of parks”). 
 115. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 116. See infra Part III. 
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process, equality, rationality, and the like.”117 One problem with the 
privatization of spaces like parks—where there is a transition from the 
government provision of a good to the private provision of a good—is that the 
government is able to avoid the obligations that it would have had if it were 
offering that good.118 Thus, there is a risk that the norms associated with the 
public provision of public space—norms discussed in Part II.A—might wear 
away. The process of privatizing public spaces means that the government is 
able to avoid its former obligations and save money. Meanwhile, private 
parties get the benefits of added development rights (in exchange for the 
provision of public access)119 and increased property value. On the other 
hand, citizens get fewer protections in these spaces than they would in 
traditional public fora.120 While the move to privatize public space carries 
substantial benefits for both government and private developers, citizens lose 
something of value. 
The bottom line is that there will be tradeoffs in any bargain of this sort. 
Perhaps public management would avoid some problems of privatization, but 
it is also possible that private management can provide for “better” spaces—
spaces that are cleaner, safer, and more well-used.121 At base, and despite the 
asserted problems with privatized public space, many localities do not have 
money to create new, truly public space, and thus these localities might 
believe that something is better than nothing.122 This view could serve as a 
justification for, and a reason to encourage the creation of, privatized public 
space as a substitute for true public space.123 Even if they are exclusionary, 
overly sanitized, or erode public norms—the argument would go—privatized 
public space still provides the public with open space. These supporters might 
also argue that, if not for privatized public space, we would have no new public 
space, or at least, far less.124 Thus encouraging or requiring the creation of 
 
 117. Freeman, supra note 21, at 1301–02 (describing this as the “public law perspective” on 
privatization, which “prioritizes legally required procedures designed to guarantee public 
participation and due process”). 
 118. Id. at 1309; Tigran Haas & Krister Olsson, Transmutation and Reinvention of Public Spaces 
Through Ideals of Urban Planning and Design, 17 SPACE & CULTURE 59, 60 (2014) (defining public 
space as a public good). 
 119. See supra Part II (discussing POPOS). 
 120. See infra Part V.B.2.ii (discussing First Amendment and state action cases). 
 121. Murray, supra note 12, at 244 (“The choice is not between fully-funded government 
management and [private non-profit] management but between government management at the 
median voter level and [private non-profit] management at the residual demand level . . . .”). 
 122. See supra Part II.B (discussing exclusionary space versus no space). 
 123. Not all cities take this view. For example, Toronto expressly notes that “POPS are intended 
to complement the City’s public parks, open space and natural areas, not replace them.” CITY OF 
TORONTO, POPS: CREATIVE PLACE MAKING TO ENHANCE URBAN LIFE 1 (2014), http://www1.toronto. 
ca/City%20Of%20Toronto/City%20Planning/Urban%20Design/Files/pdf/P/POPS_guidelines_ 
Final_140529.pdf.  
 124. Of course, here we must consider why municipalities are not creating new truly public 
open space. For example, is it because they have insufficient funds to do so or because they are 
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privatized public space is a Pareto efficient move for a city: At least some 
people will be better off, while no one will be worse off.125 Of course, 
privatized public space and no public space are not necessarily the only two 
options.126 Further, there is a concern that by concentrating on the creation 
of privatized public space, cities risk losing out on the opportunity to develop 
laws and policies that encourage better truly public spaces. The result of 
focusing legal energy on the creation of privatized public spaces is that cities 
are stuck with them: liminal, hybrid spaces that fall somewhere between 
public and private,127 and that satisfy only some of the functions of public 
space.128 
III. PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC OPEN SPACES 
A. WHAT ARE POPOS? 
Consider a tall office building in a busy downtown. It might have a large 
plaza outside, separating it from the street and sidewalk. Perhaps it has a light-
filled lobby filled with tables, chairs, and art. There might be a rooftop 
garden—one that only those with insider knowledge are aware of—that is 
accessed by passing the security desk and taking the elevator up to the roof. 
These are all examples of space connected to private buildings and owned by 
a private developer or property manager. In some instances, that is where the 
story ends. These are private spaces for the use of the building’s private 
tenants.  
However, in many cities these spaces are open to the public. And they are 
not open to the public merely by default; they were created to be used by and 
accessible to all members of the public, including (and especially) those who 
have no other business being in the building to which the space is attached. 
These spaces are variously referred to as bonus plazas, Privately Owned Public 
Open Space (“POPOS”), and Privately Owned Public Space (“POPS”). Some 
developers of buildings containing POPOS were given the opportunity to 
provide these public spaces in exchange for the ability to build larger 
 
already getting new public space in the form of POPOS? There is a risk that cities feel that their 
public space needs are being met through POPOS, and thus they fail to invest in truly public space. 
 125. See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 71–76 (2002) (describing 
Pareto efficiency); see also Russell Hardin, Magic on the Frontier: The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1987, 1996–97 (1996) (discussing Pareto’s views). 
 126. See supra text accompanying note 59.   
 127. See Paul M. Schoenhard, A Three-Dimensional Approach to the Public-Private Distinction, 2008 
UTAH L. REV. 635, 636 (“Specifically, in the modern world of quasi-public entities and 
governmental privatization, attempts to categorize entities, properties, and activities as strictly 
public or private have led to frustration and uncertainty.”). 
 128. Empirical research is needed here. For example, to determine whether cities are 
obtaining “sufficient value” from POPOS, researchers could survey local citizens, or planning 
departments or city councils could look at numbers and observable data about how, when, and 
by whom POPOS are used, and make a decision about their value.  
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buildings than otherwise would have been allowed.129 Others were required 
to provide them because their buildings were over a certain size or located in 
a certain district.130 POPOS take various forms, including plazas, arcades, 
terraces, rooftop patios, widened sidewalks, through-block spaces, and offsite 
but nearby parks.131 
POPOS ordinances have resulted in a large amount of privately owned 
public space. In the first years of New York’s program, from 1961 through 
1975, Jerold Kayden estimates that 70% of building developers obtained the 
maximum development bonus (a Floor Area Ratio, or “FAR” bonus) in 
exchange for the provision of POPOS.132 Currently in New York City alone, 
there are over 500 of these POPOS, totaling approximately 85 acres of 
space.133 San Francisco has nearly 72,134 and many major cities—both in the 
United States and elsewhere—now have similar bonus space programs.135  
 
 129. See e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION art. III, ch. 7, § 37-70 (2017) (discussing 
public plazas). 
 130. See S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 138 (2015) (requiring open space to be provided at a 
ratio of one square foot per 50 square feet of occupied office space in certain districts). 
 131. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 25–35. 
 132. Jerold S. Kayden, Incentive Zoning in New York City: A Cost Benefit Analysis, 201 LINCOLN 
INST. LAND POL’Y 11, 11 (1978). 
 133. KAYDEN ET AL, supra note 6, at 1; Németh, supra note 17, at 2464 (noting that “the 
proliferation of bonus spaces is staggering”). In New York City, “private office and residential 
developers between 1961 and 2000 built an extra 16 million square feet of private space above 
what they otherwise would have been allowed to build under applicable zoning rules in” exchange 
for the provision of POPOS. Privately Owned Public Space in New York City, ADVOCATES FOR 
PRIVATELY OWNED PUB. SPACE, https://apops.mas.org/about/history (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
“To put this trade in context, 16 million square feet of private floor area is the equivalent of 
roughly six Empire State Buildings, while 80 acres of privately owned public space equals 10% of 
Central Park.” Id. Of note, New York’s Central Park comprises 843 acres of land, which is 6% of 
Manhattan’s total acreage. Frequently Asked Questions, CENT. PARK, http://centralpark.org/faq 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
 134. San Francisco Privately-Owned Public Open Spaces, S.F. PLAN. DEP’T (Dec. 24, 2012), 
http://sf-planning.org/sites/default/files/SF_POPOS.pdf. 
 135. Németh, supra note 17, at 2464. For example, Seattle has over 40 POPOS. See Privately Owned 
Public Spaces, SEATTLE DEP’T CONSTRUCTION & INSPECTIONS, http://www.seattle.gov/dpd/tools 
resources/pops/default.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2016); see also SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 23.58A.040 
(2017) (concerning bonus floor area for open space amenities). Toronto and London also have robust 
programs.  
In order to provide this much needed open space within Toronto’s dense urban 
landscape, the City often negotiates with private developers to include [POPS] as 
part of the development application and review process. POPS are a specific type of 
open space which the public are invited to use, but remain privately owned and 
maintained. They are a key part of the city’s public realm network, providing open 
space in much needed locations across the city and complementing existing and 
planned publicly owned parks, open spaces and natural areas.  
CITY OF TORONTO, supra note 123, at 1; see Privately Owned Public Spaces, LONDON DATASTORE, 
https://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/privately-owned-public-spaces (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
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B. WHY ALLOW DEVELOPERS TO CREATE POPOS IN EXCHANGE FOR LARGE 
BUILDINGS? 
When considering the reasons for the rise of POPOS, one can consider 
the perspectives of the city, the developer, and the public; POPOS benefit at 
least two of these three entities. From the city’s perspective, POPOS are an 
efficient and expedient way to obtain more public open space. Although 
legislative history for land-use ordinances is difficult to find, New York was the 
first city to develop a POPOS ordinance, and it provides substantial 
information.136 When they were first incorporated into the zoning ordinance 
in 1961, POPOS functioned as a response to development pressures; they 
were seen “as a means of increasing light and air and green space, and easing 
the hard streetscape formed by towering buildings bordered by concrete 
sidewalks.”137 Over time, the program in New York has come to be viewed as 
means through which the city could get “new, high-quality public spaces” 
without expending its own funds.138 Similarly, in San Francisco, the zoning 
code states that POPOS exist “to meet the public need for open space and 
recreational uses.”139 As Part II.C explained, cities are increasingly moving in 
the direction of using the market to aid in the provision of public goods and 
services, including public space.140 If a city could obtain public goods for free, 
that would be of the greatest benefit to the public. Of course, developers 
generally expect something in return.  
 
 136. In San Francisco, POPOS were originally provided through a density bonus scheme that 
“stated [only] that ‘the balance shall be suitable for walking, sitting and similar pursuits.’” See 
George Williams et. al., Secrets of San Francisco, URBANIST (Jan. 2009), http://www.spur.org/ 
publications/spur-report/2009-01-01/secrets-san-francisco. Later, the city adopted a POPOS 
requirement as part of its Downtown Plan, “[t]he goal [of which] was to ‘provide in the downtown 
quality open space in sufficient quantity and variety to meet the needs of downtown workers, 
residents and visitors.’” Id. 
 137. Privately Owned Public Spaces, N.Y.C. DEP’T CITY PLAN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ 
planning/zoning/districts-tools/private-owned-public-spaces.page (last visited Dec. 19, 2017); see 
also KRISTINE F. MILLER, DESIGNS ON THE PUBLIC: THE PRIVATE LIVES OF NEW YORK’S PUBLIC SPACES 
85 (2007) (suggesting that as it was originally written, the purpose of the New York POPS ordinance 
“was not to provide new public spaces” but “to bring more light and air into the city”). 
 138. MILLER, supra note 137, at x–xi; cf. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 16 (according to an 
original report recommending the creation of POPOS, “plazas had two goals: to foster greater 
light and air at street level and to create usable open spaces”). 
 139. S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 138(e) (2015). 
 140. Németh, supra note 17, at 2466 (“In the current period of increasingly lean local 
government budgets, most major downtowns in North America and Europe have turned to 
powerful public–private partnerships to manage and maintain their publicly accessible spaces.”); 
see Matt Helms et al., 9 Ways Detroit is Changing After Bankruptcy, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 9, 
2014, 1:38 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/09/ 
detroit-city-services-bankruptcy/18716557. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving 
Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364 (2012) (describing local governments that have dissolved); Tridib 
Banerjee, The Future of Public Space: Beyond Invented Streets and Reinvented Places, 67 J. AM. PLAN. 
ASS’N 9 (2001) (describing the impact of fiscal crises in New York on public parks).  
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Thus, the creation of POPOS benefits developers as well: The city gets 
the additional public open space, but the developer often gets the ability to 
build a larger building than would otherwise be permitted under the zoning 
code. As will be discussed in more detail below, many cities use “incentive 
zoning,” whereby they waive certain height, bulk, or building footprint 
restrictions in exchange for the provision of publicly accessible space.141 
Because they gain additional private space to use or lease, developers also earn 
more: “[F]or every dollar spent on a public space, developers earned $48 in 
additional profit.”142  
Public open space—especially space located in dense urban areas, as 
many of these POPOS are—should benefit the residents of and visitors to a 
community as well. However, it is less clear that POPOS benefit the populace 
as much as they do local governments and developers. While the remainder 
of this Article will explore that idea, one community-focused justification for 
POPOS is that members of the public are better served by a city with POPOS 
and larger buildings than by a city with smaller buildings that sit flush with 
crowded sidewalks, that is filled with exclusionary private space, and that lacks 
light and air.143  
C. INCENTIVE ZONING, CONDITIONAL USE PERMITS, AND THE CREATION OF 
POPOS 
Zoning is one of the most powerful tools that municipalities have for 
extracting public goods from private parties. In the absence of a 
governmental requirement, the private sector would likely prefer to only 
provide public goods and services when they receive compensation to do so.144 
For example, cities might allocate tax dollars to pay a private service provider 
to undertake a task for less money than it would cost the city to do so itself. 
However, this approach still requires the expenditure of public funds. Thus, 
cash-strapped cities have had to be creative in figuring out ways to encourage 
or require the private sector to provide public goods without having to pay for 
them. To accomplish this goal, many cities turned to their zoning codes.145 
 
 141. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 22. 
 142. Németh, supra note 17, at 2465–66 (noting that developers often gain “increased 
profits—as a result of these transactions”). 
 143. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 22 (“[P]ublic space is density-ameliorating, in that it 
more than counteracts whatever negative impacts, such as greater street and sidewalk congestion 
and loss of light and air, that may be associated with larger buildings.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 21, at 1327 n.179 (“Profit-making institutions should 
pursue profit and nothing else, according to the dominant view.”). Of course, some private actors 
are likely motivated by good will or other non-economic factors to provide public goods. See 
Emma L. Tompkins & Hallie Eakin, Managing Private and Public Adaptation to Climate Change, 22 
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 3, 6 (2012). 
 145. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 307 n.6 (“[I]ncentive zoning is credited with being a 
marvelously creative solution for obtaining public benefits without expenditure of taxpayer 
dollars, at a time when public sector budgets are increasingly constrained.”). 
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There are three primary ways that municipalities have used zoning to 
encourage or require the provision of public space: (1) incentive zoning;  
(2) discretionary approvals; and (3) public space requirements. In most cities, 
the zoning code provides a baseline for things like a building’s height and 
bulk.146 For example, regulations might provide that a new downtown 
building cannot be more than ten stories high and cannot occupy more than 
60% of its lot’s footprint. However, there are often ways around these types of 
limitations; one of these ways is incentive zoning.  
Incentive zoning, also known as bonus zoning, “is a legislatively preset 
bargain”147 whereby private developers are permitted to ignore the baseline 
zoning restrictions; they may build bigger and taller buildings in exchange for 
a promise to provide “urban design features”—including privately owned 
public space—to the city and its residents.148 Sociologist William Whyte saw 
bonus zoning as a way to harness the greed of developers who wished to build 
the largest buildings that they could.149 Under an incentive zoning scheme 
that allows for a bulkier building in exchange for a POPOS, the requirements 
for that POPOS would be set forth in the zoning ordinance itself.150 This type 
of incentive zoning has been a primary mechanism through which cities, 
including New York, have obtained public space in recent years.151 
 
 146. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE, art. 2.5 (2017) (governing “Height and Bulk Districts”).  
 147. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 327 (4th ed. 
2013).  
 148. Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the Municipal 
Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 3 (1991); see also ELLICKSON 
ET AL., supra note 147, at 326 (“New York City comprehensively overhauled its zoning resolution 
in 1961 to authorize (among other things) ‘incentive zoning’” wherein “private developers could 
earn a higher floor area ratio (FAR) in return for providing publicly accessible spaces . . . .”). 
 149. WILLIAM H. WHYTE, CITY: REDISCOVERING THE CENTER 229 (2009) (describing incentive 
zoning as a process whereby planners would “downzone. They would lower the limit on the amount 
of bulk a developer could put up. Then they would upzone, with strings. The builders could build 
over the limit if they provided a public plaza, or an arcade, or a comparable amenity.”). 
 150. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION art. III, ch. 7, § 37-70 (2009); see also ELLICKSON 
ET AL., supra note 147, at 327 (“[P]rices for extra density or other land uses are specifically 
defined in advance in the text of the zoning ordinance itself.”); KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1 
(In describing the NYC incentive zoning scheme, it is noted that “the City offered floor area 
bonuses and other zoning concessions to office and residential developers if they would agree to 
provide plazas, arcades, atriums, and other outdoor and indoor spaces, governed by design 
standards articulated by the Zoning Resolution . . . that would be accessible to, and usable by, the 
public for as long as the buildings existed. Private ownership would reside with the developer and 
successor owners of the property, access and use with members of the public . . . . Cities across 
the country have followed New York’s lead, distributing their own zoning incentives to encourage 
the creation of privately owned public spaces.”); Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, 
Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 287, 344 (“The available regulatory benefits—and their 
‘prices’—are typically spelled out in advance in a great deal of detail and publicly available to all 
prospective developers on equal terms.”). 
 151. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 22. The first incentive zoning program to permit the 
construction of larger buildings in exchange for open space was created in Chicago in 1957. Id. 
at 304 n.50. New York’s 1961 incentive zoning ordinance was the first to expressly require the 
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In other locations, a city might have the discretion to approve a building 
above ten stories, on the condition that the developer provides something in 
exchange for that approval. In these jurisdictions, the city might require a 
Conditional Use Permit (“CUP”), Special Use Permit, or other discretionary 
approval for large buildings in certain districts, and the city will only issue 
those permits if the developer legally binds itself to provide something in 
return to the city.152 Thus, unlike the structured incentive zoning programs—
which are preset, before-the-fact, and generally applicable—this CUP 
approach is more discretionary and works on an individualized case-by-case 
basis.153 In this instance, the requirements for the POPOS would not be 
contained within the zoning ordinance, but rather within the discretionary 
project entitlements as a condition of development approval.154  
Finally, a city could simply require public space as part of a project where 
discretionary approvals were required. For example, in San Francisco, the 
zoning code was updated in 1985 so as to require developers to provide one 
square foot of publicly accessible space for every 50 square feet of commercial 
space that they developed.155  
Under any of these methods, it is important to recognize that the 
developer is getting something of value in exchange for the provision of the 
public space: a development permit to construct a project. Under incentive 
zoning schemes in particular, developers are gaining a huge advantage. For 
example, Trump Tower in New York relied upon the city’s bonus zoning 
scheme in its permitting and construction. In exchange for the provision of 
15,000 square feet of public space in the form of public gardens and an 
atrium, the developer was permitted to construct an additional 200,000 
square feet of building square footage.156 This additional square footage 
 
public space to be accessible to the public. Id. at 1; see also Németh, supra note 17, at 2466 (“The 
new code [in New York] lowered the density limit in commercial districts to 15 FAR, but allowed 
developers to add an extra 20 per cent of floor area if they provided a publicly accessible space, 
increasing the maximum FAR to 18.”). 
 152. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 15 (“Over the years, developers, seeking variances or 
special permits allowing them to obtain extra floor area beyond the base-authorized FAR or 
secure modifications of height and setback or tower coverage rules, would promise a uniquely 
crafted public space not formally described by the text of the Zoning Resolution.”).  
 153. For example, Kayden describes a POPOS at 685 Third Avenue where “the developer 
sought a variance for an additional 70,577 square feet of floor area, . . . and the Board’s 
Resolution granting this relief also required a ‘vest pocket park,’ a type of space not enumerated, 
let alone defined, anywhere in the Zoning Resolution.” Id. (footnote omitted). A city could also 
have a general, legislative approach to requiring the provision of open space as a condition of 
development approval. 
 154. See id. at 13. 
 155. S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 138(b) (2015); John King, Little-Known Open Spaces Enhance 
Downtown S.F., SFGATE (Mar. 23, 2008, 4:00 AM) http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Little-known-
open-spaces-enhance-downtown-S-F-3220966.php; see also L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 12.21(G)(2)(a) 
(1997) (requiring projects in a certain district to provide a portion of the lot area as publicly accessible 
open space). 
 156. Elstein, supra note 5.  
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translated to 20 additional floors.157 Notably, Trump himself owns 
approximately 244,000 square feet of space in Trump Tower, which makes 
his portion worth approximately $530 million.158 It appears that the tradeoff 
was valuable.159  
Regardless of the specific mechanism used to secure the provision of a 
POPOS, the developer is then tasked with operating and maintaining it as a 
space accessible to the public. This requirement might be secured through 
the filing of a declaration or restrictive covenant that runs with the land to 
subsequent owners,160 or the granting of an easement to the city.161 This 
Article will discuss the importance of the mechanism that is used below.162  
IV. PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS: A CRITIQUE OF PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC 
OPEN SPACE 
A small number of scholars in the urban studies, sociology, and planning 
fields have critiqued POPOS.163 Just as many of these commentators view 
POPOS as a form of privatized public space, many of them have critiqued 
POPOS on the basis of the same general concerns they have with privatized 
public space.164 Often, these scholars raise concerns with the way that POPOS 
are created and managed, suggesting that POPOS fail to replicate the 
functions we associate with ideal public space.165 But there is an important yet 
 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. 
 159. See id.; see also MILLER, supra note 137, at 77 (noting that IBM was able to build 147,600 
square feet of additional space in exchange for the provision of an onsite POPOS; the value of 
that additional space is estimated at “an extra $5,166,000 in annual rental revenues”). 
 160. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 17 (describing the filing of a restrictive declaration). 
 161. See, e.g., PORTLAND, OR., PLANNING AND ZONING CODE § 33.510.210(C)(17) (2017) 
(requiring open space provided as part of a FAR bonus to “be dedicated to the City” or requiring 
that “[a] public access easement . . . be provided that allows for public access to and use of all the 
open space”). 
 162. See infra Part IV.A. 
 163. Even some cities have recognized the mixed value of POPOS. For example, on its 
webpage, the City of New York states, with respect to POPS:  
An impressive amount of public space has been created in parts of the city with little 
access to public parks, but much of it is not of high quality. Some spaces have proved 
to be valuable public resources, but others are inaccessible or devoid of the kinds of 
amenities that attract public use. Approximately 16 percent of the spaces are actively 
used as regional destinations or neighborhood gathering spaces, 21 percent are 
usable as brief resting places, 18 percent are circulation-related, four percent are 
being renovated or constructed, and 41 percent are of marginal utility.  
Privately Owned Public Space, NYC PLAN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/plans/pops/ 
pops-history.page (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
 164. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 165. Don Mitchell, The Liberalization of Free Speech: Or, How Protest in Public Space is Silenced, 
STAN. AGORA, 2003, at 16–20; Németh, supra note 17, at 2464 (“While creating publicly accessible 
space where there was none before, most scholars criticise privately owned public spaces for 
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underdeveloped legal angle here as well.166 For example, the extent to which 
the law constrains behavior in these spaces is unclear because POPOS have 
not yet been fully tested in court.167 Although POPOS now exist in a number 
of cities, members of the public are often unsure whether they are able to 
exercise the same rights in these spaces as they would in other truly public 
spaces. Because there is a lack of firm guidance from city ordinances and 
governmental officials about how members of the public can use these 
ostensibly public spaces, building owners fill the void. Thus, this uncertainty 
provides an area that is ripe for legal analysis and intervention. This Part will 
present some of the key concerns with POPOS and suggest that POPOS often 
do not live up to traditional expectations for truly public spaces. 
A. LIMINALITY AND LEGAL STRUCTURES 
It is often easy to regulate when regulatory lines are clearly defined; our 
legal system has developed set rules that apply to set categories of things. As 
one commentator has noted, the legal structures that govern purely public 
spaces tend to fall within the freedom-of-assembly jurisprudence.168 In 
contrast, when we speak about purely private spaces, it is the law of property 
that governs and the right to exclude that dominates those discussions.169 
Private property is also often governed by contract law. Thus, we have clear 
yet distinct legal rules governing both traditional public spaces and purely 
private spaces.  
POPOS are interesting from a legal perspective because they are neither 
purely public nor purely private; rather, they fall somewhere in between.170 
Because of the liminality171 of POPOS, the legal authority is not completely 
 
restricting social interaction, constraining individual liberties and excluding certain undesirable 
populations.” (citation omitted)). 
 166. See Daithí Mac Síthigh, Virtual Walls? The Law of Pseudo-Public Spaces, 8.3 INT’L J.L. 
CONTEXT 394, 396 (2012) (“[T]he question of public and non-public space is neglected within 
legal scholarship.”); see also DAVID MEAD, THE NEW LAW OF PEACEFUL PROTEST: RIGHTS AND 
REGULATION IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT ERA 118 n.2 (2010) (noting that protest law scholarship 
tends to ignore the location of the protest). 
 167. For example, how strong are First Amendment rights in POPOS? See infra Part V.B.2.ii.  
 168. Mac Síthigh, supra note 166, at 396 fig.I. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Terzi & Tonnelat, supra note 26, at 521–22 (“[S]paces and spheres can be placed along 
a continuum that goes from private to public.”). 
 171. “The experience of liminal space poses a discontinuity and leads the occupant to question 
their surroundings, thus leading to heightened awareness of the space as a transformative threshold 
between distinct spaces.” Patrick Troy Zimmerman, Liminal Space in Architecture: Threshold and 
Transition iv, 5 (May 2008) (M.Arch. thesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville), http://trace. 
tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1489&context=utk_gradthes (defining liminal as 
“intermediate state or condition; an in-between condition in which the liminal entity has characteristics 
of what it is between, but at the same time is separate and distinct from them”).  
[I]n between are a series of gradations, ‘liminal’ spaces where the private and the 
public collide . . . . For urban theorists, it is at these boundary points between public 
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clear within these spaces.172 For example, POPOS are often created through 
the use of contract law rather than property law/easements.173 This structure 
raises questions as to whether those contracts would qualify as covenants that 
run with the land to bind future property owners and future potential uses.174 
Similarly, it is not immediately clear who would have standing to enforce the 
requirement of public accessibility.175 The answers to these questions will 
necessarily depend on the way that the city structures the POPOS requirement 
with the developer.176 Further, the legal authority that governs these spaces 
will develop as these spaces are used, challenged, and defined by their users. 
The liminality of POPOS also raises questions surrounding the extent of 
rights that the public has in these spaces, especially with respect to state action 
and First Amendment jurisprudence. Although a thorough discussion of this 
topic is well beyond the scope of this Article,177 at the most general level, 
owners of purely private property can restrict expressive activities on their 
property.178 On the other hand, content-based restrictions in traditional 
public fora will be subject to strict scrutiny.179 Further, courts have tended to 
protect free expression in spaces that are “traditionally understood as public, 
even if they are not publicly owned.”180 POPOS fall somewhere in the middle 
 
and private space where much of the conflict they study arises: . . . conflicts between 
haphazard, creative, and unscripted encounters between people and the highly 
scripted, controlled encounters preferred by some spatial designers.  
PARKINSON, supra note 33, at 54. 
 172. Mac Síthigh, supra note 166 (noting that “pseudo-public spaces” have a “relatively clear 
lack of legal authority”); see also Melissa Harrison & Margaret E. Montoya, Voices / Voces in the 
Borderlands: A Colloquy on Re/constructing Identities in Re/constructed Legal Spaces, 6 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 387, 392 (1996) (describing liminal spaces as those “filled with potentiality”). 
 173. See Noah M. Kazis, Public Actors, Private Law: Local Governments’ Use of Covenants to Regulate 
Land Use, 124 Yale L.J. 1790, 1811 (2015). 
 174. Id. at 1805–06 (noting that New York’s POPS program was originally administered using 
public law mechanisms but was subsequently modified to require a restrictive declaration); see also 
Jerold S. Kayden, Meet Me at the Plaza, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
10/20/opinion/zuccotti-park-and-the-private-plaza-problem.html. 
 175. To the extent that POPOS requirements are guaranteed only by the zoning code, 
“courts allow citizens to enforce zoning provisions if they ‘can establish that they have suffered 
special damage.’” Kazis, supra note 173, at 1806 (quoting KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 41). 
 176. See supra Part II.A; see also KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 41 (explaining that New York 
required certain POPOS owners “to file a restrictive declaration against its property that not only 
. . . reiterates obligations vis à vis the space . . . but assigns rents obtained from the bonus floor 
area to the City if the public space is not provided as promised”). 
 177. See infra Part V.B.2.ii (discussing state action and First Amendment jurisprudence). 
 178. But see, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85–88 (1980) (holding 
that a shopping mall is not a traditional private space because it invites the general public in, and 
thus opens itself up to some regulation).  
 179. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 180. Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1248, 1303 (2010) [hereinafter Developments] (“Although the Court treats some private entities 
as state actors, doing so in the free speech context creates tension between the autonomy and 
property rights of owners and the expressive rights of others.” (footnote omitted)). 
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of this discussion; they present examples of private property that has been 
opened to the public as a condition of development approval, but the space 
is not necessarily understood as public by the public due to the problems 
addressed in this Article.181  
Though courts are equivocal, commentators have suggested that the 
private developers and security guards who are in charge of POPOS are likely 
not state actors.182 Consequently, these developers and security guards could 
be less protective of the rights of members of the public visiting their POPOS 
than could police officers and city officials vis-à-vis visitors to a public park.183 
Although “[c]onduct that is formally ‘private’ may become so entwined with 
governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to 
become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action,” it 
is likely that the conduct of those overseeing POPOS is not so entwined.184 In 
contrast, employees of city planning departments, or elected city council 
members who adopt the rules that govern the use of public space, would be 
considered state actors, and thus would be bound by constraints found in 
 
 181. See infra Part IV.  
 182. See KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 313 n.316 (“It is unlikely that the actions of private 
owners operating public spaces obtained under the Zoning Resolution would constitute ‘state 
action’ for purposes of constitutional analysis, thereby making applicable restrictions imposed by 
the Condition.”); Stephen Tower, Note, Not in my Front Yard: Freedom of Speech and State Action in 
New York City’s Privately Owned Public Spaces, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 433, 440 (2013) (suggesting that 
private owners of POPOS are not state actors). While commentators have been more 
straightforward in making this suggestion, courts tend to note the difficulty of the question, and 
then assume, without deciding, that the First Amendment applies. See, e.g., Hotel Emps. & Rest. 
Emps. Union, Local 100 v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 544 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(failing to reach the question of whether Lincoln Center was a state actor when regulations 
governing the use of its plaza were made pursuant to a licensing agreement with the City); 
Rodriguez v. Winski, 973 F. Supp. 2d 411, 423–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (failing to find owners and 
operators of POPOS that were used during Occupy Wall Street to be state actors); Mitchell v. City 
of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 247–48 (D. Conn. 2012) (avoiding the state action question 
because the parties stipulated to the existence of a public forum); Waller v. City of New York, 933 
N.Y.S.2d 541, 544 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (assuming without deciding that the First Amendment 
was applicable).  
 183. See, e.g., Tower, supra note 182, at 440 (“As private actors, owners of privately owned 
public spaces do not have to consider the public’s constitutional rights, such as their right to free 
speech and assembly, or ensure protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, when 
instituting rules or regulations.”).  
 184. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 302 (1966) (treating a park held as a charitable 
trust “as a public institution subject to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless 
of who now has title under state law” due to its public character); see also Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d 
at 247 (“[N]either the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution nor the corresponding 
provisions of the Connecticut Constitution limit restrictions of speech on private property—even 
property, like shopping centers, which the public is generally invited to use.”); Forbes v. City of 
New York, No. 05 Civ. 7331(NRB), 2008 WL 3539936, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2008) (failing to 
find state action in the context of a publicly owned but privately licensed park). That being said, 
under California law, a strong argument could be made that they are state actors. See Golden 
Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001) (holding that the state 
action requirement is met when private property is “freely and openly accessible to the public”).  
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their state constitution, as well as the federal constitution and other laws.185 
All this being said, of the few courts that have addressed these issues in the 
context of POPOS, most have said that even if the owners or managers were 
considered state actors, and even if the First Amendment applied, the rules 
imposed by POPOS management are likely reasonable time-place-manner 
restrictions.186 
Although it relates less to the liminality of POPOS, another important 
legal issue of which cities and developers should be aware concerns whether 
POPOS should be considered exactions subject to heightened scrutiny under 
Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz.187 Although the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
here is in flux, it has not yet held that purely voluntary, incentive zoning is 
subject to analysis under Nollan/Dolan.188 Thus, although there have been 
recent debates about the subject,189 it is likely that POPOS created through 
an incentive zoning process—where the developer has a pre-defined, 
legislatively set choice of whether to build pursuant to the baseline regulations 
or to build a bigger building in exchange for the provision of open space—
would not constitute exactions that would be subject to heightened 
scrutiny.190 However, as was discussed above, not all POPOS fit that 
description; they are sometimes ad hoc or adjudicatory determinations, which 
would be subject to heightened scrutiny. Recent lawsuits have been filed 
challenging inclusionary zoning ordinances (which require developers to 
provide a certain percentage of new market-rate housing units at affordable 
rates or pay an in-lieu fee) as takings.191 Further, under Koontz, where the 
 
 185. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 313 n.316; see also infra Part V.B.2.ii (discussing state action). 
 186. See, e.g., People v. Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d 857, 863 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012). 
 187. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013) (heightened 
scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan are triggered even if a city denies a permit after an applicant 
refuses to comply with proposed conditions); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (the 
condition imposed must be “rough[ly] proportional[]” to the proposed project’s impact); Nollan v. 
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (holding that there must be an “essential nexus” 
between the legitimate governmental interest at issue and the permit condition that is imposed).  
 188. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 307 n.7; Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 150, at 328–29. 
 189. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 570 (2001) 
(“[I]ncentive zoning is difficult to distinguish from cases involving exactions, like Nollan and 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, and some commentators have concluded that it should be viewed as a 
physical taking.” (footnote omitted)); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive 
Property, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 138 (2016) (discussing “the open question of whether 
legislative exactions should be subject to the same level of judicial scrutiny to which administrative 
exactions are subject in constitutional ‘takings’ cases”); Julie A. Tappendorf & Matthew T. 
DiCianni, The Big Chill? – The Likely Impact of Koontz on the Local Government/Developer Relationship, 
30 TOURO L. REV. 455, 475 (2014) (suggesting that voluntary agreements would likely not be 
subject to heightened scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan). 
 190. But see Parking Ass’n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1116–17 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (recognizing that state courts are split as to whether Nollan and Dolan 
apply to legislatively imposed permit conditions).  
 191. Cf. James S. Burling, Do Inclusionary Zoning Laws Violate Nollan, Dolan, and the Doctrine of 
Unconstitutional Conditions?, 8 ENGAGE 83, 84–85 (2007). But see Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of 
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government provides the project proponent with a choice between the 
issuance of a permit (on condition of the provision of a public good) and not 
getting a permit at all, that may constitute an exaction.192 Koontz failed to 
clearly answer the question of whether heightened Nollan/Dolan scrutiny 
applies to legislative enactments that are generally applicable, as well as to ad 
hoc adjudicative decisions.193  
Even if a court determined that some types of POPOS ordinances, such 
as those requiring public space as a condition of development approval, would 
be subject to heightened scrutiny, it is possible that POPOS would withstand 
such scrutiny. Jerold Kayden briefly touched on this question, suggesting that 
they would pass Nollan/Dolan muster. He stated: 
[I]t is heartening to be able to argue that there is, indeed, an 
“essential nexus” between the legitimate public interest in reducing 
congestion and a condition that secures density-ameliorating 
amenities, as well as a rough proportionality between the public 
space condition and any impact associated with the bonus floor 
area.194 
I agree that there is little question about whether POPOS would meet 
Nollan’s essential nexus standard, given that bigger buildings create more 
people and more density, and POPOS provide for light and air which 
ameliorate some of the harms of that density.195 However, whether courts 
would find there to be rough proportionality between the required provision 
of public space and the impact of the bigger building is a closer question, and 
the answer would likely depend on the requirements of the POPOS, including 
its size and perhaps its hours of operation.196 It is even possible that a 
progressive court could find rough proportionality lacking because POPOS 
fail to sufficiently mitigate the harm caused by the increased building 
density.197 
B. A LACK OF SUFFICIENT LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND GOVERNANCE 
The rules that govern the use of a space are in large part responsible for 
the experience that users have while in that space. While the content of the 
 
San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 996 (Cal. 2015) (holding that inclusionary zoning ordinance was not a 
taking, but rather a permissible restriction on use). 
 192. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594–95. 
 193. Id. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 194. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 307 n.7. Of note, Kayden was writing prior to the Court’s 
decision in Koontz and prior to the recent challenges to inclusionary zoning ordinances.  
 195. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
 196. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Generally, developers get more 
additional square footage than they provide in open space. 
 197. This would be the reverse of a typical Dolan determination and would rely on a third 
party bringing the claim. See, e.g., Gregory M. Stein, Reverse Exactions, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 30–31), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2933013. 
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rules governing POPOS is important, this Subpart will first consider the 
process used to adopt those rules. Specifically, it will examine how that process 
differs from that which is used to adopt rules for publicly owned and publicly 
governed spaces, like public parks. Typically, the adoption of rules through a 
public hearing process engenders legitimacy in a way that private rule 
creation does not.198  
There is a public process involved in the creation and adoption of rules 
that govern the use of publicly owned public spaces.199 That public process 
incorporates the voice of the local citizens and provides procedural 
safeguards. First, the adoption of public rules governing parks in a given 
jurisdiction is subject to the same procedural rules that govern any public 
process, including requirements for notice and public hearings.200 Further, if 
people are unhappy with the outcome and dislike an adopted rule, they have 
the option of voting those who approved that rule out of office. Additionally, 
the end result is a set of uniform rules that typically apply to all public parks 
in a given area, thus providing local residents with set expectations about what 
they can and cannot do in their public spaces.201 
In contrast, while there is a public process used to create the rules that 
create POPOS,202 like incentive zoning, the rules governing the use of POPOS 
 
 198. See Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The Case of 
Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47, 81 (2006) (suggesting that regulatory systems are “legitimate if 
they [can] be traced to a properly functioning organ of a state”). See generally Sarah B. Schindler, 
Following Industry’s LEED®: Municipal Adoption of Private Green Building Standards, 62 FLA. L. REV. 
285 (2010) (discussing private rule creation). “When legitimacy cannot be traced back to public 
lawmaking procedures, commentators have posited certain alternative bases of legitimacy. These 
include expertise, transparency, notice, and opportunity for voice and exit.” Id. at 339. 
 199. For example, New York City’s park rules are located in Title 56 of the Official 
Compilation of the Rules of the City of New York. N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES OF N.Y.C., tit. 56, ch.2 
(2017) (Department of Parks and Recreation); see also, e.g., HONOLULU, HAW., REV. ORDINANCES, 
ch. 10 (2017) (Rules, Regulations, Charges and Fees for Public Parks and Recreation Facilities); 
RALEIGH, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES pt. 9 (2016) (Parks, Recreation and Cultural Affairs); 
HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 32 (2017) (Parks and Recreation). Cities post public 
notices of hearings when they plan to amend or revise these rules. See Rules and Regulations of the 
N.Y.C. Department of Parks & Recreation, OFFICIAL WEBSITE N.Y.C. DEP’T PARKS & RECREATION, 
https://www.nycgovparks.org/rules (last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (“Notice of Hearing: The Parks 
Department proposes to amend § 2-13 and § 2-14 of Chapter 2 of Title 56 of the Rules of the 
City of New York to allow a person with a disability to apply for a reduced membership fee using 
additional forms of documentation. The Department will hold a public hearing on the proposed 
rules at noon on October 16, 2017 at the Chelsea Recreation Center.”). 
 200. Rules and Regulations of the N.Y.C. Department of Parks and Recreation, supra note 199.  
 201. Id.; see also Németh, supra note 17, at 2464–65 (describing “the experience of publicly owned 
spaces, where rules and regulations are generally uniform throughout a park district or jurisdiction”).  
 202. See, e.g., Downtown Area Plan, Policy 9.1, S.F. GEN. PLAN, http://generalplan.sfplanning. 
org/Downtown.htm#DTN_SCS_5_1 (last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (explaining in Policy 9.1 that “[e]ach 
development should be required to provide open space in a quantity that is directly proportional to 
the amount of nonresidential space in the building”); see also Dean Macris & George Williams, San 
Francisco’s Downtown Plan, URBANIST (Aug. 1, 1999), http://www.spur.org/publications/urbanist-
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are typically set by the private developer in charge of the space.203 Thus, the 
creation of those rules is typically not subject to public oversight, resulting in 
a democracy deficit.204 This failure is the result of substantial neglect on the 
part of the cities that have drafted POPOS ordinances. In recent years, some 
ordinances have been modified to be more specific, dictating certain 
infrastructure requirements that must be present in POPOS, such as lighting, 
seating, and art.205 However, and in contrast to public parks ordinances, most 
POPOS ordinances are silent on how (and by whom) these spaces may be 
used.206 The building owners generally fill in these details, and the rules they 
create are often quite subjective.207  
Interestingly, privately created rules governing POPOS were often 
historically vague or non-existent; many of these spaces originally had no 
formal rules governing conduct within their boundaries.208 The result was 
neutral spaces that were “waiting to be defined by the user rather than by the 
owner, but the owners didn’t know that,” at least originally.209 However, the 
Occupy Wall Street (“OWS”) movement changed that dynamic. During the 
course of their protests, OWS occupied Zuccotti Park, which is a POPOS in 
Manhattan.210 The occupation of that space led some owners and managers 
of POPOS to reconsider their rules (or lack thereof).211 For example, with 
respect to Zuccotti Park itself, although no published rules for use existed at 
 
article/1999-08-01/san-franciscos-downtown-plan (describing the lengthy public process that led to 
the adoption of the Downtown Plan). 
 203. WHYTE, supra note 149, at 114 (“Most incentive zoning ordinances are very specific as to 
what the developer gets. The problem is that many are rather mushy as to what he should give.”); 
Németh, supra note 17, at 2464 (“[T]he regulations governing [POPOS] use, are introduced and 
maintained by private interests rather than city planning or governmental agencies.”).  
 204. Németh, supra note 17, at 2465 (“[B]onus space rules and regulations are not necessarily 
vetted with public agencies, so much less is known about their management approaches than 
techniques in city-owned and controlled spaces.”); see also MILLER, supra note 137, at 76 (It is 
suggested that a POPOS that was physically modified without public input “was never public 
because, from its inception, decisions over how it would be managed over time were out of the hands 
of the public. . . . [P]hysical access is of course crucial to public spaces being public. But equally 
important is access to and agency within the processes that govern public spaces.”). 
 205. See, e.g., CITY OF TORONTO, supra note 123, at 23–26; Pedestrian Infrastructure, VICTORIA 
WALKS, http://www.victoriawalks.org.au/pedestrian_infrastructure (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).   
 206. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 38. 
 207. Németh, supra note 17, at 2472. 
 208. For example, before Occupy Wall Street, Zuccotti Park had no published rules 
governing its use. See Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order at 2, Waller v. City 
of New York, 933 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (No. 112957). 
 209. JEROLD S. KAYDEN, PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACE 2 (2013), http://functionlab.net/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/720-Privately-Owned-Public-Space_small.pdf.  
 210. Brookfield Properties owned Zuccotti Park, a “privately owned public space” created in 
exchange for bonus development rights. See Verified Petition at 2, Waller, 933 N.Y.S.2d 541 (No. 
112957). 
 211. After the OWS protests in Zuccotti Park, “new signs with deeper prohibitions [began] 
appearing.” Woodward, supra note 63 (noting that many of the new signs expressly prohibit OWS-
type protest activities like camping and sleeping bags). 
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the time of the initial occupation, the building owners subsequently adopted 
rules that limited the types of items that people could have in the park and 
activities that people could undertake, including “[c]amping and/or the 
erection of tents or other structures. Lying down on the ground, or lying down 
on benches [and]. . . . [t]he placement of tarps or sleeping bags or other 
covering on the property . . . .”212 Current rules governing other POPOS in 
New York forbid “disorderly behaviour,” “loitering,” “large packages,” or the 
failure to wear “appropriate attire.”213 In New York, the zoning code allows for 
no more than one “Rule of Conduct” sign in public plazas, which “shall not 
prohibit behaviors that are consistent with the normal public use of the 
[public plaza]” including things like eating, drinking things other than 
alcohol, or lingering.214  
Courts and city officials have determined that rules governing the use of 
POPOS must be “reasonable” and designed to address nuisance-related issues 
or activities that might be inconsistent with the ability of the general public to 
use the space.215 At least in New York, the City Planning Department has been 
guided by the rules that apply to city-owned parks in determining what is 
reasonable with respect to rules for POPOS.216 While the city has determined 
 
 212. Waller, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 543. Of course, most public parks in New York are closed at night 
and have restrictions against camping. Woodward, supra note 63. Of note, OWS selected Zuccotti 
Park in part because it was a POPOS, which was “not subject to city park curfews and many of 
which are required by law to be open twenty-four hours a day.” Mattathias Schwartz, Map: How 
Occupy Wall Street Chose Zuccotti Park, NEW YORKER (Nov. 18, 2011), https://www.newyorker.com/ 
news/news-desk/map-how-occupy-wall-street-chose-zuccotti-park. 
 213. Németh, supra note 17, at 2472; see also Woodward, supra note 63 (“[Conduct] signs 
express a view of public space as fundamentally inert, of public space as a refuge from urban life 
rather than as a place of engagement within it.”). 
 214. N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 37-752 (2017). Query the difference between 
lingering and loitering, and who makes that determination. See infra Part IV.C.2; see also Tower, 
supra note 182, at 433, 449 (“Enforcement of New York City’s privately owned public spaces relies 
on a complex and ineffective system. While the city’s Department of Buildings (‘DOB’) has sole 
authority for enforcing the Zoning Resolution, it does not regularly monitor or inspect privately 
owned public spaces. Instead, the DOB relies on complaints from the public and other municipal 
agencies . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 215. The only context in which courts seem to have addressed these rules is the OWS arrests 
and subsequent lawsuits. See, e.g., People v. Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d 857, 863 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012) 
(“[O]wners [of POPS] may establish ‘rules of conduct,’ so long as these restrictions on the use of 
[POPS] are reasonable and designed to address nuisance or other conditions that would interfere 
with or are inconsistent with the intended use of the [space] by the general public.”); see also 
Waller, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 544 (“The owner has the right to adopt reasonable rules that permit it to 
maintain a clean, safe, publicly accessible space consonant with the responsibility it assumed to 
provide public access according to law.”). New York City’s Planning Department has also 
determined that owners of POPOS can set forth rules of conduct that are “reasonable.” KAYDEN 
ET AL., supra note 6, at 38.  
 216. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 38 (“In determining the definition of reasonable, the 
Department has looked to the rules of conduct applicable in City-owned parks for general 
guidance.”). It is unclear when the city would be required to, or would decide of its own accord 
to, consider the reasonableness of the rules governing POPOS. It is possible that this might only 
happen if those rules are contested. 
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that bans on sleeping in interior spaces are reasonable, it has found that the 
exclusion of “‘undesirable’ persons on some basis other than improper 
conduct, [and setting] limits on the amount of time a member of the public 
may sit in or otherwise use a space” are unreasonable rules.217 So while 
standards are emerging in some locations, there is no consistency across 
POPOS, and local governments have not yet established universal, specific use 
standards. 
C. A LACK OF INCLUSION 
In the public sphere, society seems to highly value inclusion; many 
people think that public spaces should be, and indeed are, open to all. In 
practice, however, this perception is not always true; truly public spaces can 
also be exclusionary.218 In contrast, society tends to highly value exclusion in 
the context of private property. Most first-year law students learn that the right 
to exclude is perhaps the most important stick in the bundle of property 
rights.219 Although POPOS are technically private property, the owner has 
expressly waived her right to exclude others, at least in some instances. Yet 
many of these POPOS are located inside buildings, or on rooftops or terraces, 
and thus they require a potential user to pass through doors and by security 
guards to access the public space. Such barriers to entry effectively serve to 
exclude.220  
There is no question that using legal means to incentivize and require 
public open space as a condition of development approval has resulted in a 
large amount of open space that might not otherwise exist.221 But as this 
Article has suggested, the success of that open space—whether it serves the 
purposes that open space ought to222—is less clear.223 One of the strongest 
criticisms of POPOS is that they often result in spaces that are exclusionary, 
which means spaces that are not fully accessible to the public and where only 
certain people feel welcomed.224 There are a number of reasons for this 
 
 217. Id. The city has also determined the following things to be reasonable: requiring dogs 
to be on leash and a prohibition on drinking alcoholic beverages. Id. 
 218. See Schindler, supra note 53, at 1937–38. 
 219. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
 220. One could argue that, because the city allows POPOS to be located on rooftops and 
terraces, the city does not view this placement as exclusionary. This perspective might also support 
an argument that POPOS were not intended to be true equivalents to traditional public spaces. 
 221. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1 (describing New York and stating, “the street-level 
results of the 1961 Zoning Resolution’s public space provisions may be described without 
exaggeration as one of the most effective demonstrations of law’s power to promote specific 
design outcomes”). 
 222. See supra Part III.A. 
 223. See Németh, supra note 17, at 2464 (suggesting, based on his empirical research, that 
POPOS “contribute to, or perhaps accelerate, the demise of an inclusive public realm”). 
 224. LOW ET AL., supra note 64, at 1 (suggesting that an individual who feels welcome is “often 
a tourist or middle-class visitor”); Németh, supra note 17, at 2466–67; Joseph B. Rose, Preface to 
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exclusionary environment, but this Article suggests that the two primary 
reasons are (1) the design of the space and (2) the discretionary enforcement 
of the space’s use. 
1. Exclusion Through Design 
Design is a form of regulation through architecture.225 Though just as 
powerful as regulation through law, architectural regulation is less obvious; 
we often see design as pre-political and fail to recognize that it may be 
intentional—many spaces are created so as to direct behavior in a way that the 
architect desires.226 
The rules and ordinances governing POPOS vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. While some regulations now contain details and directions for 
how to improve physical accessibility,227 that was not always the case. For 
example, New York’s original 1961 regulations did not set forth any 
requirements for aspects like seating or landscaping in POPOS.228 The result 
was that “[w]ithout functional amenities such as seating, tables, and food 
service, and with available ledges punctuated with spikes, users would have to 
look elsewhere if they wanted a place for utilitarian or passive recreational 
activity.”229 San Francisco only recently began to specify requirements for the 
size, location, and text of the signs designating that a given space is a 
POPOS.230  
An important point here is that underused, exclusionary POPOS are 
quite common; according to Greg Smithsimon, “most bonus plazas are 
designed in ways that limit use by the public.”231 Further, empirical research 
has shown that developers often intentionally create and design these spaces 
so as to make them uninviting to the public and exclusionary.232 This research 
is counter to the suggestion from some scholars that privatized public space 
is often unintentionally inhospitable,233 and that exclusion is the fault of 
 
KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at viii (“The record of ensuring that these spaces are well designed, 
open to the public, and operating in accordance with their approvals, frankly, has been mixed. . . . 
[M]any of the spaces have been neglected, and, in some cases, even privatized.”); see also Weaver, 
supra note 15, at 4 (citing Németh, supra note 17, at 2466–67). But see supra Part II.B (explaining 
how publicly owned space is also sometimes exclusionary). 
 225. Schindler, supra note 53, at 1944. 
 226. Id. at 1944–45, 1952. 
 227. See infra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 228. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 10–11. William Whyte’s research has suggested that 
usable seating is a key ingredient to creating a successful and well-used public space. See WILLIAM 
H. WHYTE, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF SMALL URBAN SPACES 27–28 (1981). 
 229. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 16. 
 230. S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE 228-12 (2012) (codifying amendment to S.F., Cal. Planning 
Code § 138(i) (2012)). 
 231. Smithsimon, supra note 17, at 326 (emphasis added). 
 232. See id. at 331 (noting that plazas’ “shortcomings are intentional rather than incidental, 
and are put in place because of developers’ preponderant influence on such spaces’ design”).  
 233. Id. at 329. 
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planners or modernist design itself.234 Smithsimon believes that building 
owners and developers influence the design for the express purpose of 
creating exclusionary spaces.235 Owners intentionally exclude in many ways, 
including through “locked gates, missing amenities, and usurpation by 
adjacent commercial activities.”236 Generally, the exclusionary design of 
POPOS can be thought of in three ways: (1) physical barriers to entry;  
(2) psychological barriers to entry; and (3) uninviting features. 
The most straightforward examples of the exclusionary design of POPOS 
are physical barriers to entry. For example, unless there are rules prohibiting 
them, the developer of a POPOS might put up a wall around the space to 
block the space from view of the public. Similarly, the developer may install a 
gate that must be entered to access the space. Another physical barrier to 
entry that is common to many downtown POPOS is the guard desk and 
turnstiles that exist in many corporate office buildings. These types of 
boundaries and barriers make it difficult for certain people to pass into these 
spaces, which are supposedly open and accessible to the public.237 For 
example, a guard might ask to see identification and require a signature 
before entering an office building that houses a POPOS. A person who is 
homeless might be without identification, or an undocumented immigrant 
might feel uncomfortable leaving her name. 
There are also a number of exclusionary techniques that might be called 
“psychological barriers to entry,” in that they prevent easy public access to 
POPOS. For example, people must have knowledge that these spaces exist, 
and that they are open to the public, in order to achieve success as inclusive 
public spaces.238 Unless there are regulations requiring them to install 
substantial signage, it might be in the best interest of some project developers 
to avoid publicly denoting a space as public.239 This observation is especially 
true for POPOS that are located inside office buildings or above the ground 
floor. Without adequate signage, people have to rely on word of mouth or 
internet listings (which only exist in some cities) to find spaces such as these, 
which are hidden from the outside or appear completely private. The 
aforementioned recent additions of on-site signage requirements in some 
 
 234. Id. at 328; see JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 22–25 
(1992) (discussing modernist planners). 
 235. Smithsimon, supra note 17, at 326, 335 (“[D]evelopers play a larger and more 
intentional role in the creation of exclusive plazas than previously believed.”). 
 236. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1. 
 237. See Schindler, supra note 53, at 1953–60 (discussing barriers to access). 
 238. Joseph B. Rose, Preface to KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at viii (“The more that people know 
about these resources, the more likely it is that these spaces can fulfill their promise to the public.”); 
see also id. at at 28 (“Public knowledge about public space is a sine qua non for public use and access 
. . . .”); Németh, supra note 17, at 2473–74 (discussing lack of signage as a problem). 
 239. Municipalities have, until recently, been derelict in making information about these 
spaces public in any organized manner. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.  
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cities that denote both the existence of POPOS and the fact that they are 
public has done some work toward achieving greater inclusivity.  
Another psychological barrier involves “filtered spaces,” which use a 
variety of techniques to “filter or sort users to ensure an appropriate 
clientele.”240 These techniques might include posting rules that are either 
subjective or general (which places great discretion in the hands of those 
patrolling the space or enforcing the rules),241 displaying certain types of 
public art that only appeal to certain populations, or providing space for food 
trucks or kiosks along with seating that appears to require a person to buy 
food in order to use the space.242 All of these physical design elements could 
result in psychological barriers to use for people who might feel that they will 
not “fit in” in this space. This feeling of exclusion relates to what Lior 
Strahilevitz has termed “exclusionary vibes”—although anyone is free to 
physically and legally enter, certain people feel that the messaging or signals 
of the space suggests that it is not meant for people like them: people who are 
homeless, people of color, foreigners, or otherwise outsiders.243 Further, 
because many POPOS are located in downtown office buildings, they are 
commonly filled with people in business attire. Thus, someone who does not 
work downtown, or who is not dressed in this way, might feel out of place or 
unwelcomed in the space. As one commentator noted, people feel 
“programmed . . . to feel like trespassers in office buildings where [they] have 
no business, or hotels where [they] have no room . . . .”244 The design and 
patronage of a space can enhance those feelings, even if a person does have 
business being there—as a member of the public who is entitled to use a 
POPOS. 
A last psychological barrier involves the fact that POPOS are often under 
surveillance, either through the use of security guards or through the use of 
cameras.245 As Foucault noted, there is self-policing in surveyed spaces, 
especially if people are unsure of the rules in those spaces: “He who is 
 
 240. Németh, supra note 17, at 2470–72. 
 241. See infra Part IV.C.2.  
 242. Németh, supra note 17, at 2470–73; Emily Badger, How to Make Privately Owned Public Spaces 
Truly Open to the Public, CITYLAB (Dec. 17, 2012), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2012/12/how-
make-privately-owned-public-spaces-truly-open-public/4168 (“The presence of food vendors also has a 
way of making us feel like we must pay for something for the right to sit down.”). 
 243. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1835, 1851 (2006) (“[The] exclusionary vibes approach involves the landowner’s communication to 
potential entrants about the character of the community’s inhabitants. Such communication tells 
potential entrants that certain people may not feel welcome if they enter the community in question, 
because they will not share certain affinities with existing or future residents.”).  
 244. Badger, supra note 242. 
 245. Low, supra note 46, at 44 (“[F]amiliar physical barriers such as bollards, planters, 
security gates, turnstiles, and equipment for controlling parking and traffic are now reinforced 
by electronic monitoring tactics—such as metal detectors, surveillance cameras and continuous 
video recording.”). 
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subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for 
the constraints of power . . . .”246 Surveillance also functions as a form of 
“disorder suppression” in public space.247 It thus makes sense that building 
owners, worried about their paying tenants who also often have to walk 
through POPOS to access their offices, would seek to survey its use. 
Finally, many POPOS are exclusionary because they have been designed 
so as to be uninviting to members of the public. It is common sense that 
people will not want to spend a lot of time in places that make them 
uncomfortable. Developers have used that idea to their advantage in 
designing spaces of exclusion. For example, POPOS have long discouraged 
use by failing to install any usable seating, thus making it difficult for people 
to stay in the space for long.248 Further, some POPOS might provide seating, 
but make it immobile and bolted into awkward positions. This design 
technique has been shown to be less inviting than seating that allows choices, 
such as movable chairs and tables.249 A related trend that has become popular 
in POPOS around the world is the use of anti-homeless measures, such as 
metal spikes in the ground around buildings and the use of bench armrest 
dividers that prevent people from lying down.250 These architectural tools 
prevent people from sitting or lying down in space that is meant to be 
public.251 Another method of exclusion through uninviting features is a lack 
of diversity in terms of microclimates252: The POPOS might be either entirely 
in shade or completely without shade.253 Depending on the local climate, this 
practice can make a space practically unusable. Additionally, although 
POPOS are often required to be open until dusk or later, developers might 
fail to install or operate lights in the spaces at night, thus making them feel 
 
 246. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 202 (1977). 
 247. Mike Davis, Fortress Los Angeles: The Militarization of Urban Space, in VARIATIONS ON A 
THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF PUBLIC SPACE 154, 154–55 (Michael 
Sorkin ed.,1992); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7 
(2004) (suggesting that the “first function of property regulation” is “disorder suppression”—
seeking to curb bad behavior). 
 248. See Németh, supra note 17, at 2473. 
 249. See WHYTE, supra note 228, at 28 (suggesting the incorporation of choice into seating design); 
Nate Berg, The Power of the Movable Chair, CITYLAB (Oct. 8, 2012), https://www.citylab.com/design/ 
2012/10/power-movable-chair/3520 (describing the value of movable seating in public spaces). 
 250. Robert Rosenberger, How Cities Use Design To Drive Homeless People Away, ATLANTIC (June 
19, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/06/how-cities-use-design-to-
drive-homeless-people-away/373067. 
 251. As I have written about previously, these architectural tools are a form of regulation, just 
as laws are, and they create exclusionary spaces. See generally Schindler, supra note 53. See also 
KAYDEN, supra note 209, at 2 (“The idea that owners of these spaces should be able to design 
against these [undesirable] people, through insertions of spikes and dividers and other barriers, 
to me is political, is design against a politics of inclusion that is problematic.”). 
 252. Németh, supra note 17, at 2473. 
 253. Id. 
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unsafe and uninviting.254 Finally, it is worth noting that sometimes, even if the 
design is sufficient, the property may be poorly maintained—dead foliage, 
trash—such that it is no longer welcoming.255 
It is important to recognize that some cities have become aware of certain 
design defects and have revised their POPOS ordinances to require design 
that is more inclusionary and user-friendly.256 However, despite some progress 
in the design of these spaces, many are still not operated in an accessible 
manner. Thus, POPOS often see less public use than they should pursuant to 
the requirements inherent in their creation. The following Subpart addresses 
these concerns. 
2. Exclusion Through Discretionary Enforcement of Rules and  
Norms 
Even when POPOS have an inclusionary design and provide the 
necessary physical manifestations of good public space, that alone will not 
ensure that a space will be successful.257 This is in large part because of the 
importance of the actions of those who enforce the rules and maintain 
decorum in the space.258 Specifically, private-building owners and their 
security guards control the operation of these public spaces, and they may act 
in exclusionary ways if they do not like the way the space is being used by the 
public.259 There are a number of methods through which building owners 
and managers exclude through their discretionary actions. These methods 
include: (1) the intentional non-compliance with clear rules; (2) the lack of 
awareness about governing laws and rules for the space; (3) the discretionary 
enforcement of vague rules; and (4) the enforcement of private space norms 
in POPOS.  
Oftentimes, clear rules exist regarding the use and design of a space, but 
those in charge of the POPOS seek to violate those rules in order to halt a use 
of the space that they dislike. A common manifestation of perceived 
 
 254. See id. 
 255. See Kent Barwick, Preface to KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at viii (“Some plazas were badly 
designed or unfortunately sited. . . . More than a few, initially valuable, have been poorly 
maintained.”). Similarly, some POPOS are simply sited in undesirable locations, which makes 
their use unlikely. 
 256. For example, as has been mentioned earlier, New York now requires seating, and San 
Francisco requires signage. S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE 228-12 (2012); N.Y.C., N.Y., Zoning Resolution 
art. III, ch. 7, div. 37-741 (2009). 
 257. Joseph B. Rose, Preface to KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at viii (“[H]igher regulatory 
standards, alone, do not assure a successful space.”). 
 258. See supra notes 203–07 and accompanying text; see also Rose, supra note 257, at viii 
(explaining that POPOS often “do not serve fully the purposes for which they were intended, 
occasionally because of poor design but primarily because they are operated in a way that restricts 
public use and access”). 
 259. See, e.g., Németh, supra note 17, at 2474 (explaining that owners of these spaces have a 
tendency “to control space by actively discouraging public use”). Of course, as was discussed 
earlier, public spaces can have exclusionary management as well. See supra Part I.B. 
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“undesirable use” of a POPOS takes the form of homeless people entering 
and using corporate atriums that are POPOS. One striking example of this 
involves our current President, Donald Trump, and his headquarters, Trump 
Tower. Trump Tower opened in 1983,260 and, as was mentioned earlier, 
developers agreed to provide on-site public space in exchange for additional 
square footage.261 One of the design requirements of this POPOS was that it 
provide seating in the atrium in the form of a bench.262 However, after Trump 
Tower opened, building management placed large planters on top of the 
bench, such that it was not usable for seating.263  
Trump defended the move at the time, writing in a letter to the 
Department of City Planning, “We have had tremendous difficulties 
with respect to the bench—drug addicts, vagrants, et cetera have 
come to the atrium in large numbers.” He continued, “Additionally, 
all sorts of ‘horrors’ had been taking place that effectively ruined the 
beautiful ambience of the space which everyone loves so much.”264  
In this instance, the city did require that the planters be removed, but these 
sorts of exclusionary behaviors by those who manage POPOS are not 
uncommon. Indeed, as recently as July 14, 2016, the bench was missing.265 
This example suggests that even when cities implement clear prescriptive 
design requirements that are meant to make POPOS more usable by the 
public, building managers are charged with carrying out those requirements. 
While city enforcement can help to remedy non-compliance, a city is generally 
only made aware of noncompliance when members of the public complain.266 
Some building owners have gone so far as to actively discourage public 
use by instructing their guards “to discourage public entry.”267 Of course, it is 
hard to know whether exclusionary actions on the part of security personnel 
are at the behest of their employers, or if their actions are based on incorrect 
assumptions about how public the space actually is.268 But there have been 
 
 260. Robert Rosenberger, Trump Tower and the Question of ‘Public’ Space, ATLANTIC: BUS. (Aug. 25, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/trump-tower-and-the-question-of-
public-space/494027. 
 261. See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text. 
 262. Rosenberger, supra note 260. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. (quoting Matt A.V. Chaban, An Altar to Donald Trump Swallows Up Public Space in 
Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/nyregion/an-
altar-to-donald-trump-swallows-up-public-space-in-manhattan.html). 
 265. Id. The bench has since reappeared. Matt A.V. Chaban, Disputed Benches Quietly Return to 
Trump Tower, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/23/nyregion/ 
disputed-benches-quietly-return-to-trump-tower.html. 
 266. See supra text accompanying note 214. 
 267. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 16; see also Németh, supra note 17, at 2474 (explaining that 
owners of these spaces have a tendency “to control space by actively discouraging public use”). 
 268. Kohn provides an example of this, noting that “[p]rivate security guards expel political 
activists and other undesirables who violate a set of often unwritten rules. These rules are flexibly 
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reports that the security guards in Trump Tower “discourage people” from 
seeking out and visiting the public gardens.269 Further, during Trump’s run 
for President, the public atrium of Trump Tower was often closed for press 
conferences without prior approval from the City.270 Trump and his 
employees are not alone in these exclusionary behaviors. A study conducted 
by the Manhattan Borough President’s office in 2008 determined that 39% 
of the POPOS “on the East Side [of Manhattan] had cut off access, failed to 
clear litter or committed some other violation.”271  
Some POPOS lack formal rules for use, or the rules that they have are 
vague and general. In these instances, enforcement is solely within the 
discretion of the building owners and the private security guards who patrol 
the space.272 Even if formal rules do exist, unless and until these rules are 
challenged, the private security guards charged with their enforcement 
decide whether they are “reasonable.”273 It is likely that these private actors 
are more interested in protecting the interests of their private employers (and 
the building’s private users) than protecting the rights of the public to use 
these spaces.274 Because of this mindset, the norms of use that govern POPOS 
are often those established by the private guards, building owners, and 
building tenants, instead of members of the public.275 These norms likely 
encourage an environment that matches the purely private space to which the 
 
and differentially enforced in order to sustain an illusion of openness while maximizing 
management’s control. Exclusiveness is often achieved through indirect mechanisms . . . .” 
KOHN, supra note 17, at 13 (footnote omitted). 
 269. Rosenberger, supra note 260. Another reporter had the following experience:  
It took this reporter six attempts over two weeks to get into the Trump gardens. The 
first try came on a recent Friday morning shortly after 9 a.m., when a security guard 
said the gardens didn’t open until 10 a.m. When I came back he changed that to 
10:30. The third try came one afternoon at 5:15, and a guard said the gardens had 
closed 15 minutes earlier, even though they’re required to be open during store 
hours and the Starbucks on the second floor was selling iced coffees to tourists. 
Elstein, supra note 5. 
 270. See Elstein, supra note 5. 
 271. Id.  
 272. Id. (“My fifth attempt [to enter the public gardens] came on a wet Wednesday at noon. 
I asked an elevator guard when the garden is open. ‘It is open from 10 to 5,’ he said. ‘May I visit?’ 
I asked. ‘No.’ ‘Why not?’ ‘It has started to rain. The garden is now closed.’”). 
 273. See, e.g., Németh, supra note 17, at 2481; id. at 2466 (noting that managers of these spaces 
“prioritise security concerns over social interaction . . . . by employing a wide variety of interrelated 
legal, design and policy tools to exclude certain undesirable populations” (citation omitted)). 
 274. See id. at 2463 (“[A]s developer priorities are often fiscally driven, most approaches [to 
managing POPOS] severely limit political, social and democratic functions of public space and 
produce a constricted definition of the public. As such, [POPOS] have deleterious effects on 
concepts of citizenship and representation, even as they become the new models for urban space 
provision and management.”). 
 275. See, e.g., Elstein, supra note 5 (“Entering the elevators requires getting past security 
guards who seem to specialize in shooing people away.”). 
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POPOS is attached; for office buildings, this might be a space that is quiet, 
passive, and staid. 
Another manifestation of exclusion involves the enforcers not actually 
knowing the rules. For example, a New York Times reporter recently brought a 
small group of people to an “impromptu pizza party[]” in the café area of a 
Manhattan hotel lobby, which was a designated POPOS.276 The bartender told 
them that they were not allowed to consume outside food in the space and 
that they would have to leave.277 However, according to the ordinances 
governing POPOS in New York, a POPOS is not permitted to limit usage to 
paying patrons.278 Similarly, a number of journalists exploring POPOS have 
encountered security guards who ask them to leave or to stop filming their 
interactions.279 Although these forms of exclusion are not unique, they should 
be impermissible given the public nature of the space. 
As is evident from these examples, even if inclusionary design, access, and 
use policies are in place, they can be selectively enforced by the private guards 
in charge. This discretion may result in the exclusion of the “wrong type” of 
people and inclusion of those people to whom the building owners want to 
cater.280 Empirical research would be helpful in determining how often this 
type of selective exclusion occurs.281 
It is likely that some of these exclusionary behaviors occur because the 
space is privately owned, and they would not be present if the space were 
 
 276. Matt A.V. Chaban, Unwelcome Mat Is Out at Some of New York’s Privately Owned Public Spaces, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/nyregion/unwelcome-mat-
is-out-at-some-of-new-yorks-privately-owned-public-spaces.html. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 37-727 (2007). But see N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING 
RESOLUTION § 37-73 (2016) (allowing for placement of kiosks and open-air cafes in some POPOS). 
 279. See Bradley L. Garrett, The Privatisation of Cities’ Public Spaces Is Escalating. It Is Time to Take a 
Stand, GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2015, 3:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/aug/04/pops-
privately-owned-public-space-cities-direct-action (A photographer in a POPOS in London had “set up 
a tripod there recently to take a photo, and was immediately asked by security whether he had a permit 
to do so. When he said he did not, he was ordered to move across the canal to get his image. In other 
words, he was kicked out of ‘public’ space.”); Jerold S. Kayden, Meet Me at the Plaza, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/20/opinion/zuccotti-park-and-the-private-plaza-
problem.html (explaining that he has visited every POPOS in New York and that “[g]uards, sometimes 
accompanied by dogs, have from time to time stopped me from taking photographs or speaking into 
a handheld recorder”); infra notes 315–20 and accompanying text (discussing how Rebar members 
were asked to stop filming in POPOS).  
 280. See BRYANT SIMON, EVERYTHING BUT THE COFFEE: LEARNING ABOUT AMERICA FROM 
STARBUCKS 92–93 (2009) (discussing selective enforcement).  
 281. Researchers could collect data on things like: the use of the POPOS; how many people 
get turned away; and how patrons’ use of POPOS compares to use of other public spaces that are 
similarly situated (of comparable size, in a similar part of town). With this kind of comparative 
data, we could better assess whether POPOS are largely going unused or underused nationwide, 
and if they are failing to accomplish their stated purposes. 
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owned publicly.282 This is because POPOS invite a conflict of interest; the 
private building owner would prefer not to have members of the public 
disturbing its residents and tenants. The presence of members of the public—
and especially certain “undesirable” members of the public—causes problems 
that might not exist if the space were truly private. That conflict does not exist 
in the same way with publicly owned public space, as its function and goal is 
to provide access and entry to all citizens, at least theoretically.283 Of course, 
recalling the idea of idealized public space addressed earlier,284 even true 
public space—that which is owned and operated by the government—is often 
exclusionary and suffers from many of the same problems as POPOS. This is 
especially true with respect to how homeless people are treated in public 
space. As one commentator stated, “[h]istory is replete with examples of 
exclusionary laws that minimize the presence of ‘undesirable people’ in 
public space.”285 Therefore, we must be careful not to compare an imperfect 
reality to a perfect yet imaginary alternative. 
D. A LACK OF AUTHENTICITY 
A final important problem with POPOS is that they often feel sanitized 
and inauthentic, lacking “the rough edges [and] unpredictability that make 
true public space so vital and democratic.”286 At base, they are a simulacrum—
an imitation of real public space.287 This is a complaint that has been levied 
against other forms of privatized public space, including new outdoor malls 
and lifestyle centers.288 However, discussions of authenticity are more the 
 
 282. Of note, “surveys consistently show that visibly poor people report more frequent 
harassment from private security or BID ambassador-type authority figures than from police 
officers.” Rankin, supra note 29, at 40. 
 283. But see supra Part I.B (discussing idealized views of what public space is and should be). 
 284. See supra Part I.B.   
 285. Rankin, supra note 29, at 13 n.41, 41 (discussing the increase in laws that 
criminalize the behavior of visibly poor and homeless people in public space); see Sheila R. 
Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 60–61 (2011) 
(noting the undesirability of homeless people in public space). 
 286. See HENRY SHAFTOE, CONVIVIAL URBAN SPACES: CREATING EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SPACES 77 
(2008) (referring to privatized public spaces as “a kind of sanitized version of public space”); see 
also SIG LANGEGGER, RIGHTS TO PUBLIC SPACE: LAW, CULTURE, AND GENTRIFICATION IN THE 
AMERICAN WEST 111 (2017) (defining authenticity as “a practice, not a trait” and “a sense of 
realness of experience that all people . . . strive to achieve in everyday life”). 
 287. Simulacrum, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2002). For an 
explanation of simulacrum, see generally JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION (1994). 
 288. See, e.g., Angelo Carusi, When Authentic is Fake, NAT’L REAL EST. INV. (May 1, 2003), http:// 
www.nreionline.com/mag/when-authentic-fake; Thaddeus Herrick, Fake Towns Rise, Offering Urban Life 
Without the Grit: Mix of Office, Home, and Play Threatens the Real Thing; But Where’s the Grocery?, WALL ST. J. 
(May 31, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114904207386167125; Terry Schwarz, 
Urban-Suburban Inversion, in The Next Big Idea in Urban Design, GREEN BUILDING & DESIGN MAG., 
http://gbdmagazine.com/2015/the-next-big-idea-in-urban-design (last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (“It’s 
easy to dismiss the ersatz urbanism of suburban lifestyle centers as somehow inauthentic . . . .”). But cf. 
Philip Nobel, Good Malls and Bad Cities, METROPOLIS MAG. (Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.metropolismag. 
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province of urban sociologists; few legal scholars have written about 
authenticity as it relates to law and space.289 
The question of what is authentic—and who gets to decide what is 
authentic—is itself somewhat problematic. One problem with authenticity as 
it relates to public space is that truly authentic places are often sought after, 
and thus colonized and gentrified, which can result in a perceived lack of 
authenticity.290 This practice is not necessarily a bad thing though; many 
consumers of space today seek places that look authentic, but not those that 
feel or smell that way.291 Privatized public space can fill that desire. It often 
presents as a “Disney-fied” version of public space—space that looks nice but 
lacks grit and a semblance of truth.292  
This issue of authenticity in public space also evokes Laurence Tribe’s 
famous article that discussed the value of plastic trees and nature more 
broadly.293 One could imagine that privatized public spaces are examples of 
what Tribe recognizes as “artificial objects and settings supplant[ing] those 
supplied by nature.”294 While even the most public of urban public parks are 
constructs, they are meant to provide a natural respite from the density of the 
city. The private ownership of and control over a public space often results in 
 
com/uncategorized/good-malls-and-bad-cities (“With free speech (thriving elsewhere) taken out of 
the equation, with all arguments based on ‘authenticity’ banished to the postmodern echo chamber 
. . . . [lifestyle centers] look like unadulterated good news.”). 
 289. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Historic Preservation and Its Even Less Authentic Alternative (Coase-
Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 777, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2838456; see also MAXINE GREENE, THE DIALECTIC OF FREEDOM xi (1988) (The 
“authentic public space” is defined as “one in which diverse human beings can appear before one 
another as, to quote Hannah Arendt, ‘the best they know how to be.’ Such a space requires the 
provision of opportunities for the articulation of multiple perspectives in multiple idioms, out of which 
something common can be brought into being.”). See generally SHARON ZUKIN, NAKED CITY: THE DEATH 
AND LIFE OF AUTHENTIC URBAN PLACES (2010) (discussing a connection between a demand for 
authenticity and gentrification); Margaret McFarland, Urban Integrated Developments: Visible and Invisible 
Forces, 45 REAL EST. REV. J. (2016) (“[A]uthenticity is less about historic elements and more related to 
a place that connects people to community and provides a bridge to one’s aspirations.”). 
 290. See generally ZUKIN, supra note 289 (discussing the pursuit of authentic public space). 
 291. Strahilevitz, supra note 289, at 13 (noting that historic preservationists “do not want to 
smell what previous generations smelled”). 
 292. See generally, e.g., Eric Rofes, Imperial New York: Destruction and Disneyfication Under Emperor 
Giuliani, 7 GLQ 101 (2001) (reviewing SAMUEL R. DELANY, TIMES SQUARE RED, TIMES SQUARE 
BLUE (1999)) (discussing the transformation of New York into a glorified version of itself); 
Sharon Zukin et al., New Retail Capital and Neighborhood Change: Boutiques and Gentrification in New 
York City, 8 CITY & COMMUNITY 47 (2009) (discussing the transformation of New York to the 
displeasure of the locals). 
 293. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think about Plastic Trees: New Foundations for 
Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974) (discussing fake trees in displacing nature’s objects). 
Tribe was responding to an article in Science Magazine that suggested that plastic trees could 
replace real ones—“that people’s love of nature is easily manipulable and that manufactured 
products could easily duplicate the utilitarian benefits of nature.” Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic 
Trees to Arrow’s Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 344. 
 294. Tribe, supra note 293, at 1316. 
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spaces lacking a public spirit or character. These features give a sense that the 
space is fake, or at least less authentic than a traditional public park, and thus 
really not public at all.295  
* * * 
Due to all of these problems, moving forward, cities should seriously 
consider refraining from the creation of new POPOS. Instead, they could 
focus energy on finding ways to create better truly public space. However, that 
path might not be possible for all cities. Further, given that a large number of 
these spaces currently exist, cities must find ways to improve them. The 
following Part will focus on ways to approach that challenge. 
V. PRIVATE SPACE AND ITS PUBLICIZATION 
This Article has suggested that members of the public are likely not 
getting the benefit of their bargain in exchange for POPOS, given that they 
are exclusionary and less successful than ideal public space should be. Thus, 
this Part considers what might be gained by thinking of POPOS through a 
lens of “publicization” rather than privatization.296 This Part begins 
descriptively, focusing on the fact that POPOS involve private property, but 
property which is being set aside—at least for the life of the building to which 
it is attached—for use by the public. Thus, this property has already been 
“publicized,” in the literal sense; if not for POPOS ordinances, this space 
would be purely private property and thus the owner’s right to exclude would 
be paramount. This Part goes on to consider the normative implications of a 
publicization framing, and it suggests ways that communities can use law, 
norms, and design to make POPOS more valuable forms of public space. 
A. FRAMING POPOS AS PUBLICIZATION NOT PRIVATIZATION 
As this Article has explained, commentators have legitimately described 
POPOS as an example of privatized public space.297 That framing leads to 
many of the concerns with POPOS addressed above. However, this Subpart 
suggests that POPOS are perhaps more accurately described as an example of 
the publicization of private space. Flipping the descriptive narrative and 
framing POPOS in this way allows us to talk about the potential unexamined 
benefits that inure when private property is made public, and thus more 
inclusionary. This publicization framework also allows us to view POPOS in 
conjunction with the progressive property theory literature, which will be 
discussed below. 
 
 295. See, e.g., Torben Huus Larsen, The Museum of Appalachia and the Invention of an Idyllic Past, 
in PUBLIC SPACE AND THE IDEOLOGY OF PLACE IN AMERICAN CULTURE 81, 85–86 (Miles Orvell & 
Jeffrey L. Meikle eds., 2009) (noting that we build spaces “around an idealized vision of a society 
void of unpleasant social and political issues, . . . [which] offer a spatial and temporal vacuum, 
presenting an escape not only from the modern world but also from history itself”). 
 296. See supra text accompanying note 21 (noting various scholars’ definitions of publicization). 
 297. See supra Part II.C.1. 
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In most instances, POPOS—and the buildings to which they attach—sit 
on urban land that was purely private and closed off to the public before the 
project at issue was constructed. In exchange for development rights, some 
landowners have decided to strike a publicization deal: They agree to provide 
public access to their previously purely private property. The private property 
owner’s right to exclude is being bent in the direction of public access, and 
the property owner herself is agreeing to bend that right in order to 
accommodate more comers. Of course, the public does not get to access this 
private property at no cost. In this exchange, the public is giving up something 
of value. The cost is that the municipality allows denser development, and 
thus all the harms associated with that denser development are visited upon 
the members of the community.298 So while something is gained (access to 
POPOS), something is lost (compliance with the baseline zoning that would 
have resulted in more limited density).299  
Through this exchange, private property owners agree to limit their right 
to exclude, and in turn, to make more generous use of their “right to 
include.”300 As Professor Daniel Kelly noted in his article about this right, 
property owners can facilitate the inclusion of others onto their property 
either formally, through contract or property law, or informally, through 
social norms.301 Currently, POPOS generally rely on inclusion through either 
property or contract law, depending on the city and the mechanisms it relies 
upon to secure public access in POPOS.302 However, cities could use a 
publicization framing of POPOS to assist in fostering informal inclusion in 
these spaces through the importing of public space norms into POPOS, 
supplemented with updated and improved laws.303 The following Subpart will 
further examine this idea. 
B. BETTER LIVING THROUGH PUBLICIZATION: MAKING POPOS MORE PUBLIC 
Publicization is a descriptively useful term in thinking about how POPOS 
are different from traditional privatized public spaces, but publicization can 
also be a useful normative concept in thinking about how to improve POPOS. 
Jody Freeman used the term publicization to explain a new way of looking at 
privatization.304 She suggested that privatization might in fact be a method 
 
 298. The harms include things like loss of light and air, and more crowded sidewalks and 
public transportation. But there are also substantial benefits associated with density. See infra 
notes 382–83 and accompanying text. Thus, dense cities tend to be more sustainable and 
environmentally friendly. See infra notes 385–86.  
 299. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 15, at 4 (“[Z]oning restrictions are lifted in return for the 
construction of public space.”). 
 300. See generally Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857 (2014). 
 301. Id. at 859. 
 302. See supra Part III.A. 
 303. See supra Part IV.B. 
 304. Freeman, supra note 21, at 1285. 
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through which the government could infuse private actors with public values, 
norms, and goals.305 Here, the Article suggests that we might carry the idea of 
publicization forward and extend Freeman’s term into the fields of local 
government and property law. Instead of focusing broadly on public law goals 
and democratic norms as Freeman does, here the focus is on public space 
norms and laws. Specifically, this Part suggests that cities and citizens should 
use both norm change and legal change to make POPOS more public, 
democracy-enhancing, and able to carry and support the values of public 
space.306  
1. Norms 
Given the important values that traditional public space fosters and 
furthers, it makes sense that “new” public space should support those same 
values. Values are often expressed in a given locale through social norms, and 
“[i]nformal norms, rather than legal rules, have long governed the allocation 
of urban public spaces.”307 Regardless of the underlying rules that are put in 
place by the private property owner, communities can import and enforce 
social norms that are normally associated with truly public space into 
POPOS.308 This importation of public space norms could be done formally, 
as Freeman suggests, through “budgeting, regulation, and contract,” or 
informally, simply by regularly using these privately owned public spaces as 
one would true public spaces.309 
From a formal perspective, extending Freeman’s idea to POPOS might 
take the form of making a bonus zoning deal contingent on a POPOS owner’s 
agreement to ensure her management of the POPOS adheres to the values 
and norms associated with traditional public space.310 Indeed, compliance 
with public space norms could be a condition attached to the development 
permit. In this way, cities could use the law to influence norms, turning 
 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. at 1290. 
 307. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Private Norms and Public Spaces, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 183, 
198 (2009) (noting that “police departments are again taking an interest in public-space norms 
of decorum”). 
 308. These “public space norms” would include public law norms—“democratic norms of due 
process, rationality, equality, and accountability,” and “universal access and nondiscrimination”—as 
well as behavioral norms that people might broadly associate with public space, such as, for example, 
relaxing, singing, eating, protesting, demonstrating, and arguing. Freeman, supra note 21, at 1325, 
1351; see also supra Part IV. The key is that “residents should be involved in identifying and 
prioritizing which norms should be enforced and which should be suppressed.” Garnett, supra note 
307, at 193. 
 309. Freeman suggests using more formal methods to extend public law norms to private actors, 
including through “budgeting, regulation, and contract.” Freeman, supra note 21, at 1285. 
 310. Id. (“[T]he state can exact concessions—in the form of adherence to public norms—in 
exchange for contracting out its work.”). 
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building managers into public space norm enforcers.311 However, it would 
likely be difficult to precisely pin down the relevant public space norms, and 
thus contracting and enforcement would be complicated.312 Further, 
Freeman recognizes that this process might be “costly and burdensome,” 
which might “undermine [efficiency] gains from privatization.”313 However, 
this is not something that cities have tried with respect to POPOS, and it seems 
to be an area where the costs might be worthwhile (especially given the great 
value that the private owner gets in exchange for the POPOS). 
If localities are unwilling to take formal action with respect to norms, 
members of the public can do so informally, by acting as norm entrepreneurs. 
As Don Mitchell has said, “[p]ublic space is . . . socially produced through its 
use as public space.”314 An example of this idea in practice was Rebar’s 
Commonspace Project.315 This art and design collective in San Francisco 
brought groups of people together to stage interventions in POPOS around 
San Francisco.316 For example, 101 Second Street is a downtown office 
building, the first floor of which contains an indoor atrium that is a POPOS. 
A visitor to this space might typically observe people sitting and talking or 
eating lunch. The social norms that seem to govern the space are those of an 
indoor office building: people speaking in quiet voices, people wearing 
business attire, people walking and not running. To challenge the norms of 
this space, Rebar brought a group of people into the space.317 The group sat 
in a circle on the floor and began performing a Balinese chanting ritual that 
involved both loud vocal chants and coordinated movements.318  
 
 311. See Garnett, supra note 307, at 194–98 (describing police officers’ roles as norm 
enforcers, in addition to law enforcers).  
 312. Freeman, supra note 21, at 1288 (explaining that the “government might insist on 
detailed contractual terms and on supervising compliance with them”). 
 313. Id. at 1290, 1339 (noting also that it is not “obvious that selectively adding due process, 
public participation, or oversight will undermine all of the economic gains and technical 
innovations that might come from reliance on private service providers. Surely it depends on the 
instruments we use”); see also Jon Pierre & Martin Painter, Why Legality Cannot Be Contracted Out: 
Exploring the Limits of New Public Management, in REASSERTING THE PUBLIC IN PUBLIC SERVICES: NEW 
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORMS 49, 59 (M. Ramesh et al. eds., 2010) (“To become agents of 
‘publicization’ private contractors would have to make significant investments in staff training 
and be willing to, as Freeman suggests, become quasi-agents of the state.”). 
 314. MITCHELL, supra note 50, at 129. 
 315. See Commonspace, REBAR, http://rebargroup.org/commonspace (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). 
 316. These actions included a group of people taking naps in a public solarium inside a 
corporate office building, and another group flying kites on an office building’s rooftop garden 
that was open to the public. These interventions were often met with resistance from local security 
guards. They were also often asked to stop video recording the interventions. Rebar Commonspace 
Podcast, AIA S.F. (Oct. 19, 2007, 3:32 PM), https://player.vimeo.com/video/348507. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id.; Matthew Roth, Unlocking San Francisco’s Privately Owned Public Open Spaces, STREETSBLOG 
SF (Jan. 20, 2009), http://sf.streetsblog.org/2009/01/20/unlocking-san-franciscos-privately-owned-
public-open-spaces. 
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First, there is no law on the books would prevent this intervention. 
Second, it is likely that there were no POPOS rules of conduct in place at the 
time that would prevent this action. It is also questionable what such rules 
would look like and whether they would be “reasonable.” However, the 
chanting ritual certainly violated the social norms of the space; it is an activity 
one might expect to find in a public park in San Francisco, but not in a staid 
corporate atrium. Of course, a single intervention such as this likely will not 
change the norms of a POPOS overnight. However, repeated actions might.319 
During the course of Rebar’s Commonspace interventions, the security 
guards who were faced with these actions attempted to stop them, sought out 
building management, asked the collective to stop filming the interventions, 
and (upon the insistence of an ACLU representative who accompanied the 
group) called the police.320 It is likely that the security guards did not know 
whether any rules prevented this action, but sensed that it was in violation of 
the norms of the space. By taking actions that challenge the private space 
norms that currently exist in many POPOS, groups like Rebar and Occupy 
Wall Street are doing the work toward carrying out Kayden’s observation that 
POPOS were waiting to be “defined by the user rather than by the owner.”321 
Even if there had been rules of conduct in place that prevented these 
sorts of interventions, that does not destroy the possibility of redefining these 
spaces. Throughout history, we have seen examples of people acting as agents 
of change in violation of local rules or laws, but in accordance with more 
progressive social norms. These transgressive actions sometimes result in a 
change in the underlying rules and laws.322 And while chanting and 
occupation might seem extreme to some members of the public, there are 
ways that cities could assist their residents in extending public space norms to 
POPOS.323 For example, studies have shown that norm change, though 
difficult, is possible through education.324 Thus, cities could use public 
information campaigns to ensure that people are aware of the existence of 
POPOS and their rights in those spaces. Markets could also be employed here 
through the creation of apps that use GPS to tell people whether they are 
 
 319. See Dale T. Miller & Deborah A. Prentice, Changing Norms To Change Behavior, 67 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 339, 341 (2016) (explaining that interventions can modify norms and behavior).  
 320. Roth, supra note 318; see Commonspace, supra note 315. Of note, the police apparently 
agreed with Rebar’s interpretation of the use of the space and refused to respond to the call. Id.  
 321. KAYDEN, supra note 209, at 2.  
 322. Sarah Schindler, Unpermitted Urban Agriculture: Transgressive Actions, Changing Norms, and 
the Local Food Movement, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 369, 370; see, e.g., Sarah Schindler, Regulating the 
Underground: Secret Supper Clubs, Pop-Up Restaurants, and the Role of Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
DIALOGUE 16, 17 (2015).  
 323. The role of the city here would not be out of character. As Nicole Garnett recognized, 
“city governments have become norm-entrepreneurs and norm-enforcers.” Garnett, supra note 
307, at 184. 
 324. See Miller & Prentice, supra note 319, at 341. 
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close to a POPOS.325 Cities could also make it clear that people have remedies 
if they feel that their rights in POPOS are not being honored. 
Educational campaigns should target not just the residents of a locality, 
but also the people who own and manage POPOS. It is possible that once 
building owners and security guards are educated about the value of and need 
for true public space, they will assist in shifting the norms within these spaces. 
As one commentator noted, “[t]he process of publicization consists in making 
perceptible both the troubled situation and its problematic consequences, so 
that appropriate measures can be taken.”326 Once the problems are known to 
the actors, citizens and municipalities can begin to work with owners to make 
efforts to change the norms. 
Finally, the process of imbuing private actors with public space norms 
might also have the effect of expanding existing understandings of property 
and power.327 Freeman notes that her conception of publicization might “find 
a warmer reception among corporate law scholars known for their 
communitarian views, . . . who may be more sympathetic to the idea that 
corporations have social obligations.”328 Although she is writing generally 
about corporate law and governance, this concept is easily extended to 
property law: A number of property scholars view property through a social 
obligation lens.329 And while law and economics scholars often tout the value 
and importance of the right to exclude others from private property, this new 
cadre of progressive property scholars—who tend to take a social obligation 
norm approach to property law—focus instead on situations when the right 
to exclude should be diluted to allow for greater human flourishing.330 
Indeed, courts have agreed that a property owner is not able to exclude all 
 
 325. San Francisco and New York now have websites that list all POPOS and allow people to 
comment upon and rate them. See Privately Owned Public Space in New York City, ADVOCATES FOR 
PRIVATELY OWNED PUB. SPACE (June 22, 2017), http://apops.mas.org; Privately-Owned Public Open 
Space and Public Art (POPOS), CITY & CTY. S.F., http://sf-planning.org/privately-owned-public-
open-space-and-public-art-popos (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). San Francisco also has an app, 
though it does not appear to be connected to GPS. See Discover an SF Secret, POPOS, sfpopos.com 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2017).  
 326. Terzi & Tonnelat, supra note 26, at 527. 
 327. See Freeman, supra note 21, at 1327 n.179. 
 328. Id. 
 329. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 25, at 747 (“[P]roperty owners owe far more 
responsibilities to others, both owners and non-owners, than the conventional imagery of 
property rights suggests. Property rights are inherently relational . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); see 
also LÉON DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS GÉNÉRALES DU DROIT PRIVÉ DEPUIS LE CODE 
NAPOLÉON 21 (2d ed. 1920) (arguing that property has a social function that the owner has a 
duty to fulfill). 
 330. Alexander, supra note 25, at 745 (defining “human flourishing” as “enabling individuals 
to live lives worthy of human dignity”); id. at 747; Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of 
Progressive Property, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 743, 743 (2009); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 821, 842–44, 854–56 (2009); Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative 
Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 138 (2013). 
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others from her private property in all instances; the right to exclude must 
sometimes bend in the face of important competing public policy concerns.331 
With respect to POPOS, the owner’s agreement to limit the right to exclude 
brings the general public into private spaces, and further blurs the line 
between private and public space. This process of publicization may thus have 
the indirect effect of reshaping conceptions of private power and exclusion 
in a way that fosters these more progressive views of property. The result might 
actually be to “enhance public law norms by extending them to realms where 
they typically do not play a significant role”—here, private property.332  
2. Laws 
While I believe that norm change is key to realizing the full potential 
value of POPOS, the law also has a very important role to play. This Subpart 
will address methods of improving POPOS that could be used in conjunction 
with norm change so that these spaces provide greater value to all people in 
a locality. First, the most straightforward way that law could be used to achieve 
these ends is that cities could create more detailed zoning requirements that 
address not just the physical features that are required of POPOS, but 
prescriptive details about inclusion, accessibility, and use requirements as 
well. Similarly, cities might simply decide to impose their existing park codes 
on POPOS, with some modifications to the enforcement provisions.333 
Second, state courts could interpret their state constitutions so as to provide 
for greater free speech rights in POPOS than in more traditional privately 
owned spaces that are open to the public, like malls.334 
i. Legislation/Ordinances 
A fairly obvious and easy step that cities could take to improve POPOS 
would be to adopt ordinances that prescriptively address both the design of 
POPOS and how these spaces may be used. Here, it is important to 
acknowledge that design requirements and use requirements are different 
solutions to two different problems—many POPOS are designed to be 
exclusionary, but many are also operated that way. Thus, local governments 
considering how to improve access and use of POPOS must address both 
problems: exclusionary design and exclusionary enforcement and operation. 
 
 331. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371–72 (N.J. 1971). 
 332. Freeman, supra note 21, at 1314 (emphasis omitted). 
 333. Perhaps this has not been done because such a step would be viewed as too great an 
intrusion into private property rights. However, given the discussion in this Article, I would 
suggest that imposing these rules would be proper. 
 334. See supra note 184. 
SCHINDLER_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2018  1:12 PM 
2018] THE “PUBLICIZATION” OF PRIVATE SPACE 1147 
a. Design 
When POPOS were first coming into use in New York, many of the plazas 
were not very functional.335 Early POPOS were often “empty expanses of 
concrete, seen by users as desolate, depressing, cold, and aesthetically hostile 
environments.”336 Spaces with poor designs will be poor public spaces, 
regardless of whether the ownership structure is public or private.337 As was 
discussed earlier, these design decisions are often intentional on the part of 
developers who want to create exclusionary spaces.338 
Seeing these trends, one commentator suggested that the POPOS zoning 
programs should “better counter developers’ private interests with public 
ones.”339 One way to counter the influence of developers is for cities to create 
more specific design standards for the creation and operation of POPOS.340 
Indeed, recognizing the problems with POPOS, or perhaps responding to 
these criticisms, some municipalities have adopted more stringent design 
requirements for these spaces. For example, New York now sets forth six 
different types of seating that may be used to meet seating requirements—
including movable seating, walls, steps, and benches—and also describes the 
best types of seating arrangements.341 Strict design standards that evoke a 
public character are especially important with respect to indoor POPOS, 
which “run the inherent risk of being unnoticed by the passing pedestrian or 
other members of the public.”342 
Cities should go further by specifically prohibiting things like border 
fences around exterior spaces and requiring floor to ceiling windows for 
interior spaces. Signage denoting the public nature of the space should be 
large, consistent, and noticeable. Cities should also refuse to allow POPOS to 
be located on upper stories or interior courtyards, or in any other location 
where a member of the public would have to pass through a security 
 
 335. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 16. 
 336. Id. 
 337. For example, Portland, Maine’s Congress Square Park, which is owned by the City, has been 
derided as poor public space, in large because of its design, which involves a sunken concrete pit. In 
recent years, an active Friends of the Park group has raised money and organized programming that 
has made the park more successful and active. See The Story of Congress Square Park: How a Derelict Plaza 
Got a New Identity Downtown, PROJECT FOR PUB. SPACES (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.pps.org/blog/the-
story-of-congress-square-park-how-a-derelict-plaza-got-a-new-identity-downtown. 
 338. Smithsimon, supra note 17, at 326, 331. 
 339. Id. at 331. 
 340. As Whyte pointed out, “[l]ack of guidelines was a force for mediocrity. Developers 
wanted the minimum done . . . . And that is what they got.” WHYTE, supra note 149, at 114. 
 341. See N.Y.C., N.Y., Zoning Resolution art. III, ch. 7, div. 37-741 (2009); see also Privately Owned 
Public Space: Current Standards, NYC PLAN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/plans/pops/ 
pops-plaza-standards.page (last visited Dec. 21, 2017) (describing design regulations). 
 342. KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 33; see also N.Y.C., N.Y., Zoning Resolution art. VII, ch. 
4, div. 74-873(c) (2009) (requiring that “the public character of the proposed covered pedestrian 
space shall be obvious from the outside of the building”). 
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checkpoint to enter. Moreover, cities could require specific maintenance 
standards, allow members of the public to report through an app if a space 
was not meeting those standards,343 and impose fines for violations.  
Finally, cities could consider modifying their POPOS ordinances to allow 
for public participation in the design process, as well as any proposed changes 
to existing POPOS designs in the future, whether “physical or 
programmatic.”344 There are currently no real legal requirements for public 
oversight of or participation in changes to existing POPOS.345 This gap in the 
system amounts to the existence of spaces that provide the public with physical 
access, but that bar them from access to governance processes, which is 
perhaps just as important.346 
b. Use 
Cities should also add a section to their POPOS ordinances that addresses 
how these spaces may or must be used. Currently, there are no such provisions 
in the San Francisco or New York ordinances.347 As Jerold Kayden noted, “the 
events at Zuccotti Park highlight[ed] the continued inadequacy of the laws 
regarding privately owned public spaces.”348 And as was addressed above, this 
dearth of laws has been filled, in some instances, by private owners and 
operators who have stepped in to draft their own rules of use, while other 
spaces have no use rules in place, providing total discretion to those who 
oversee the spaces.349 
Creating more detailed use regulations should not be difficult for cities, 
as they have created similar requirements in other contexts—the most 
obvious of which are their public parks codes. For example, public parks 
ordinances govern things like hours of operation,350 camping,351 leafleting 
and picketing,352 use of musical instruments,353 when and why parks may be 
 
 343. Many cities are already using an app called “See, Click, Fix” to report problems to public 
works and city officials. Top Performing Cities, SEE CLICK FIX, https://en.seeclickfix.com/recent_ 
place_stats (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). 
 344. MILLER, supra note 137, at 77. 
 345. Id. at 76. 
 346. Id. 
 347. See generally S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE art. 1.2, § 138 (2015) (listing POPOS 
regulations); N.Y.C., N.Y., Zoning Resolution art. III, ch. 7 (2017) (listing POPS regulations); 
Privately Owned Public Space: Current Standards, NYC PLAN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/ 
plans/pops/pops-plaza-standards.page (last visited Dec. 21, 2017) (describing POPS regulations). 
 348. Jerold S. Kayden, Meet Me at the Plaza, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/10/20/opinion/zuccotti-park-and-the-private-plaza-problem.html. 
 349. See supra Part III.C. 
 350. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., PARK CODE art. 3, § 3.21 (2013) (regulating hours of operation); N.Y.C., 
N.Y., DEP’T PARKS & RECREATION, Rules & Regulations § 1-03, https://www.nycgovparks.org/rules/ 
section-1-03 (last visited Dec. 21, 2017) (regulating hours of operation). 
 351. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., PARK CODE art. 3, § 3.12 (2008) (prohibiting camping). 
 352. See, e.g., id. art. 7, § 7.08 (regulating petitioning, leafletting, picketing, and soliciting). 
 353. See, e.g., id. art. 4, § 4.01(k) (regulating the use of percussion instruments). 
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closed,354 and sale of goods or merchandise within a park without a permit or 
license.355 Of course, some of these existing public parks rules are restrictive 
of rights. Even public decision-makers have made exclusionary choices when 
it comes to municipal infrastructure and use.356 Thus, cities could go further 
by adding language that expressly requires POPOS to be open to all people, 
regardless of attire, or whether they are carrying bags. These ordinances 
should be inclusive so that even a person who is not dressed in business attire, 
or who is obviously homeless, would be welcomed into the space.357 The key 
is that there must be a public process for adopting or changing rules that 
govern the use of POPOS.  
ii. Courts 
There is also a role for courts to play in ensuring that POPOS function as 
a substantial replacement for traditional public space. This role would first 
require courts to acknowledge the extent to which privately owned space is 
supplanting traditional public space in many cities.358 This realization could 
then lead courts to review and potentially expand their First Amendment and 
state action jurisprudence, thus imposing public space laws on private actors 
who own and manage POPOS.359 By treating private actors as state actors, 
courts might also require them to adhere to norms of democratic 
accountability.360 
As the brief, earlier discussion of First Amendment and state action 
jurisprudence suggested, an expansion of either doctrine would aid in 
allowing POPOS to function more as traditional public space.361 The Court’s 
state action jurisprudence currently “requires a threshold showing of state 
involvement for most constitutional claims.”362 However, some commentators 
have suggested, as this Article does, that the state action doctrine should 
 
 354. See, e.g., id. art. 3, § 3.03 (noting that parks may not be closed “because of the content 
or viewpoint of expressive activities . . . to the extent such expressive activities are protected by 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution”). 
 355. Id. § 3.10. 
 356. See, e.g., Schindler, supra note 53, at 1953–72 (describing the ways cities are planned to 
limit access to certain areas). 
 357. Of course, norms would go a long way toward making the space feel inclusive; often 
inclusive laws are not enough. 
 358. Articles such as this one can help to deliver that information. 
 359. This currently seems highly unlikely. 
 360. Freeman, supra note 21, at 1319. 
 361. See supra notes 177–86 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment and state 
action jurisprudence). 
 362. Developments, supra note 180, at 1303, 1305 (noting that in Hudgens v. NLRB, “[t]he 
Court held . . . that a threshold showing of state action is necessary to sustain a free speech 
challenge because the First Amendment is a check ‘on state action, not on action by the owner of 
private property used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only’” (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 
424 U.S. 507, 519 (1976))). 
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account for the blurring of lines between public and private space.363 For 
example, Erwin Chemerinsky wrote that the existing “state action doctrine is 
an absurd basis for choosing between the two liberties [those of violator and 
victim]. The concept of state action completely ignores the competing rights 
at stake and chooses based entirely on the identity of the actors.”364  
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken directly about POPOS, it 
has spoken about other public–private hybrids. In Marsh, a woman was 
arrested for trespassing after distributing religious literature on a sidewalk in 
“a company-owned town.”365 The town was owned and operated by a private 
corporation but otherwise resembled a normal municipality.366 The Court 
there stated, “[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property 
for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed 
by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”367 Thus, First 
Amendment rights applied in this seemingly public space.368  
The Court first extended, but then later contracted, this doctrine.369 In 
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, anti-war protestors were attempting to distribute leaflets 
in a mall before being forced to leave by mall security.370 There, the Supreme 
Court held that the First Amendment does not “limit restrictions of speech 
on private property—even property, like shopping centers, which the public 
is generally invited to use.”371  
Where do POPOS fit in this jurisprudence? Although POPOS share 
features with company towns, that is not enough; the Court has suggested that 
“private property must be the functional equivalent of an entire town,” not just 
a portion of one.372 But POPOS are also distinct from malls. They generally 
 
 363. Developments, supra note 180, at 1303–04 (discussing “the courts’ developing approach 
to free speech on private property”). 
 364. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 537 (1985) (footnote 
omitted). 
 365. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946). 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. at 506. 
 368. The curiosity is that company towns are an anachronism; they no longer really exist in 
the modern United States. See Adrienne Iwamoto Suarez, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions 
. . . on Free Speech? First Amendment Rights in Common-Interest Communities, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 739, 748 (2006). 
 369. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159 n.8 (1978) (expressing “doubt that Newton 
intended to establish [the] broad doctrine” that “operation of a park for recreational purposes is 
an exclusively public function”); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976) (narrowing Marsh); 
Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968) 
(extending Marsh to shopping malls); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (treating 
privately run parks as state actors). 
 370. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 552–66 (1972). 
 371. Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 247 (D. Conn. 2012) (citing Lloyd, 
407 U.S. at 551). In Lloyd, the Court read Marsh narrowly, but did not overturn it. Lloyd, 407 U.S. 
at 569–70. 
 372. Steven Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition of 
Constitutional Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After Marsh v. Alabama, 6 WM. & 
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lack the commerce element, and owners of POPOS are not inviting the public 
into their space as part of their business model; they are required to do so 
under the relevant POPOS ordinance.373 Some scholars have argued for 
extending state action to private community associations and malls, given the 
rise in suburbanization.374  
However, I would go further. There was a time that public life centered 
around a public town square. Due to a number of factors, including 
government funding, many white families left city centers for the suburbs, 
hollowing out those cities and contributing to their decline and decreased tax 
base.375 Victor Gruen designed malls so that suburbanites could experience 
the feeling of a town square without the trash and vagrants.376 But in the last 
decade, malls have been dying and many people have been returning to city 
centers.377 City-dwellers are now finding their public space wherever they can, 
including in hybrid spaces like POPOS, which often exist because cities were 
cash strapped and looking for ways to cut costs. This pattern of movement 
suggests that it might be time for the Court to reconsider its reasoning.378 
Justice Marshall dissented in Lloyd, stating:  
It would not be surprising in the future to see cities rely more and 
more on private businesses to perform functions once performed by 
governmental agencies. . . . As governments rely on private enterprise, 
public property decreases in favor of privately owned property. It 
becomes harder and harder for citizens to find means to 
communicate with other citizens. . . .  
When there are no effective means of communication, free speech 
is a mere shibboleth.379  
 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 461, 474 (1998); see also Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 513 (stating that private property 
would be treated public if there were “residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage 
disposal plant and a ‘business block’” (quoting Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502)). 
 373. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 374. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 372, at 475 (making an argument that residential community 
associations are the modern-day equivalent of a company town and thus a “functional equivalent 
of a municipality”); Josh Mulligan, Note, Finding a Forum in the Simulated City: Mega Malls, Gated 
Towns, and the Promise of PruneYard, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 533, 545 (2004) (suggesting 
a reconsideration of whether shopping centers are state actors in light of suburbanization). 
 375. See JACKSON, supra note 10, at 265–71. 
 376. See generally M. JEFFREY HARDWICK, MALL MAKER: VICTOR GRUEN, ARCHITECT OF AN 
AMERICAN DREAM (2004) (discussing Gruen’s career, including his design of shopping malls). 
 377. See generally Schindler, supra note 34 (discussing the shuttering of enclosed malls and 
strip malls). 
 378. Some state courts have recognized this. See Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 172 P.3d 
742, 745 (Cal. 2007); see also Developments, supra note 180, at 1309–10 (“The court’s argument is 
that shopping malls have become the new public fora as the concept is understood in First 
Amendment jurisprudence, not that California’s constitution defines new types of public space.”). 
 379. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 586 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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In many modern cities, privatization is so prevalent that opportunities to 
speak in a public forum have been diminished. It might thus be time to 
reinvigorate the Marsh doctrine.380 By doing so, courts could aid in the 
publicization of hybrid spaces.381 Indeed, some state courts have already 
recognized the move toward privately owned public space.382 For example, 
California courts base their inquiry on whether the property is publicly 
accessible, rather than whether there are government actors involved, when 
determining whether state action exists.383 Thus, POPOS would appear to 
qualify. If federal courts fail to expand their definition of state action, state 
courts can, and have begun to, intervene.384  
VI. CONCLUSION 
For many years, scholars have been urging cities to build up, not out.385 
Dense municipalities are more sustainable municipalities.386 But dense cities 
 
 380. “Broadening Marsh’s scope could help account for factors on both sides of the debate 
by considering private title and public usage in state action analysis . . . .” Developments, supra note 
180, at 1314; see also First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 
1114, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002) (“‘As society becomes more insular in character, it becomes essential 
to protect public places where traditional modes of speech and forms of expression can take 
place.’ We think this is particularly true with respect to downtown public spaces conducive to 
expressive activities.” (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737 (1990) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment))).   
 381. These are hard questions, and they implicate the debate around formalism versus 
functionalism. Justice Marshall and I suggest a functional approach, but the Court has become 
much more formalist when it comes to the First Amendment. They also raise questions about 
rules versus standards; it is easier to have a bright-line rule that says private individuals and 
business are not governed by the Constitution. The Court has drawn that line repeatedly with 
other constitutional provisions (limiting, for example, the government’s power to regulate 
private actors using its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power). Thus, adopting more 
expansive state statutes might be a more successful approach here. 
 382. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (explaining that a state may 
“adopt in its own constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the 
Federal Constitution” and “a State in the exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable 
restrictions on private property” as long as it avoids a taking). 
 383. Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001) 
(holding that the California free speech provision contains a state action requirement, which is 
met when private property is “freely and openly accessible to the public”). 
 384. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (calling for state courts to rely on state constitutions in order to 
vindicate and enhance individual rights); Paul W. Kahn, Comment, Interpretation and Authority in 
State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147 (1993) (same); see also G. Alan Tarr, The New 
Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 1112 (1997) (looking at the extent 
to which states courts have acted to expand civil liberties under state constitutions). 
 385. See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS 1–2, 134 (2006) (“Cities in the abstract are the 
solution to the global environmental crisis . . . .”); Robert Cervero, Growing Smart by Linking 
Transportation and Urban Development, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 357, 358 (2000); William C. Clark, A 
Transition Toward Sustainability, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1021, 1061 (2001). 
 386. Peter Newman, The Environmental Impact of Cities, 18 ENV’T & URB. 275, 285 (2006) 
(encouraging density over sprawl); Margaret E. Byerly, Research Report, A Report to the IPCC on 
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are also often crowded and shaded; residents need access to open spaces. 
These spaces should provide light and air, of course, but that is not enough. 
People need spaces that provide them with the benefits that public space has 
long aimed to provide: opportunities to build social capital, to nurture 
democratic values, and to have conversations with strangers from a variety of 
social strata. POPOS provide physical space, but they often fail to provide the 
same value and accessibility that public space should. Thus, cities and their 
residents are currently not getting the benefit of their bargain in the POPOS 
deal.  
Once cities acknowledge and take seriously the problems with their 
POPOS, they can begin to formulate solutions. As this Article has suggested, 
if cities view POPOS through a lens of publicization, they can begin to see the 
potential embedded in these spaces. Indeed, it is possible that some POPOS 
could become more inclusionary than even public parks, as individual 
building owners could make decisions to allow things that cities often do not, 
such as camping.387  
Moving forward, cities should also consider that POPOS might not be the 
best solution for their locality. For example, in a community that has existing 
un-built urban land, or urban land with derelict buildings that could be torn 
down and replaced with green space, it would likely be better to require 
developers to pay an in-lieu fee in exchange for greater density. This fee could 
be used to create new publicly owned public space in areas of the city where 
it is needed. Indeed, cities could even try to strike a similar deal with the 
owners of existing, suboptimal POPOS: The POPOS could become private 
space in exchange for a substantial contribution toward the creation of new 
publicly owned public space. The key is that cities must take action; developers 
should not be able to benefit from larger buildings, thus imposing density-
related harms on the public, without providing a truly worthwhile, substantial 
benefit. In their current forms, POPOS fail to provide that benefit. 
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